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EXCHANGE PATTERNS AND RELATIONS IN COLLABORATIVE 
GOVERNANCE 
Charles Wharton Kaye-Essien 
May 13, 2016 
Collaborative governance has received considerable attention in recent years. 
From environmental resource management to public safety, collaborative governance 
continues to play a vital role in regional problem solving. In spite of this increasing 
popularity previous attempts to model the political, economic, and demographic 
determinants of collaboration have in most cases produced inconsistent results, thereby 
undermining the ability to generalize from such findings. Additionally, our understanding 
of the relational patterns that emanate from collaborative agreements remains fairly 
rudimentary.  
The main objective of this research is to address some of the gaps in the literature 
and improve our understanding of collaborative governance by examining existing 
patterns of collaboration in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Using transaction cost 
economics theory and the concept of network embeddedness as theoretical lenses, the 
study examines collaborative governance by going beyond what already exists in current 
literature – determinants of collaboration– to explore what has barely been addressed – 
patterns of collaboration. This research includes which services are the strongest 
candidates for collaboration, which levels of government are the best candidates for 
vi 
 
partnerships (vertical or horizontal) and what number of partners are appropriate for 
collaborative arrangements (bilateral or multilateral).   
The units of analysis for this study are ‘home rule’ cities in Kentucky with 
populations above 230 people. A city-by-service cross-sectional pooled data was derived 
from existing agreements signed between years 2000 and 2013 to test the research 
hypotheses. Descriptive statistics were used to measure the relation between transaction 
characteristics and the pattern of collaboration while binary logistic regression models 
were used to test the relation between network embeddedness and the pattern of 
collaboration. 
 The findings of the study showed that compared to other public services, 
economic development services have a greater association with vertical collaboration 
whilst public safety services have a greater association with horizontal collaboration. 
Similarly, infrastructure services have a greater association with bilateral collaboration 
whilst public safety services have a greater association with multilateral collaboration. 
The study also corroborated previous findings that asset specificity and service 
measurability have strong influence on the likelihood of collaboration. With respect to 
the pattern of collaboration, the study indicated that compared to other transaction 
characteristics, services that have high levels of asset specificity but easily measurable 
have greater associations with vertical and bilateral collaborations. Similarly, services 
that have high levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty have greater 
associations with horizontal and multilateral collaborations.  With respect to network 
embededdness, the study established that repeated interaction in the past has the most 
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An Emerging Governance Model  
Collaborative governance and its variants – administrative conjunction 
(Fredrickson, 1999), cross-sector collaboration (Bryson et al., 2006; Simo & Bies, 2007), 
collaborative planning (Healey, 2003; Innes & Booher, 1999; Selin & Chevez, 1995; 
Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998) and collaborative public management (Agranoff, 
2006; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Cooper et al., 2006; Leach, 2006) – have received 
considerable attention in urban affairs, public management and environmental 
management research over the past few decades (cf. Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011; 
Gerlak et al., 2013; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005; Kettl, 2000; 
O'Toole, 1997; Salamon, 2002; Weber et al., 2005). From infrastructure and housing 
development to education and health care delivery, collaborative governance has 
emerged as an essential institutional arrangement for providing public goods and  
services (Tang & Mazmanian, 2010).  
Similar to the emergence of hierarchies in the agricultural age and bureaucracies 
during the industrial age (McGuire, 2006), collaborative governance has emerged as a 
new management paradigm, one “… that defines its task more broadly than do previous 
paradigms and achieves many of its purposes through a dynamic of network governance” 
(Stoker, 2006, p. 43). Scholars of collaborative government have reiterated that vertical 
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hierarchies of command and control no longer possess the solutions to the complex 
problems of the 21st century (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; O'Toole, 1997). Rather, 
collaborative webs of multiple government and nongovernmental institutions operating at 
different scales and across different jurisdictions offer more inclusive and adaptable 
solutions to the persistent contemporary problems of poverty, fiscal distress and natural 
disasters (Alter & Hage, 1993; McGuire, 2006).  
In public management, collaborative governance is the process of “…facilitating 
and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be 
solved, or easily solved, by single organizations” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 4). In 
urban affairs, collaborative governance is largely regarded as a mode of “governance 
without government” (Savitch & Vogel, 2000). In the field of environmental resource 
management collaborative governance is a process of pooling together institutional 
resources to plan and manage cross-jurisdictional environmental problems (Bentrup, 
2001; Gerlak & Heikkila, 2006; Innes & Booher, 1999; Selin & Chevez, 1995). Although 
scholars approach the concept from different perspectives, the fundamental principle of 
agreement is the notion of constructive engagement – open and inclusive communication 
and the representation of diverse interests. As Bressers, O’Toole, and Richardson (1995) 
observe:  
“No organization of government possesses sufficient authority, 
resources, and knowledge to effect the enactment and achievement 
of policy intentions. Instead, policies require the concerted efforts of 
multiple actors, all possessing significant capabilities but each 
dependent on multiple others to solidify policy intention and convert 
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it into action. Indeed, it is often difficult for any one actor, or group 
of actors, to manage, or manipulate, the flow of problems and 
solutions onto the political agenda in the first place.” (p. 4) 
 
Toward a Working Definition of Collaborative Governance 
The concept of ‘governance’ is generally understood as the act of steering “…the 
process that influences decisions and actions within the private, public, and civic sectors’’ 
(O'Leary et al., 2006, p. 7). The term ‘collaborative’ on the other hand denotes co-
laboring and cooperating across boundaries in multi-sector relationships to achieve 
common goals (O’Leary et al., 2009, p. 3). Put together, collaborative governance 
conveys the notion that existing institutions across localities can be harnessed in a 
cooperative, reciprocal, fluid and voluntary manner (Savitch & Vogel, 2000) to provide 
public services (Parks & Oakerson, 1989). The definition of collaborative governance 
adopted for this research is that of Tang and Mazmanian (2010, p. 4): 
“…the process of establishing, steering, facilitating, operating, and 
monitoring cross-sectoral organizational arrangements to address public 
policy problems that cannot be easily addressed by a single organization or 
the public sector alone. These arrangements are characterized by joint 
efforts, reciprocal expectations, and voluntary participation among formally 
autonomous entities, from two or more sectors —public, for profit, and 
nonprofits —in order to leverage (build on) the unique attributes and 




This definition of collaborative governance extends beyond the conventional focus 
on the public manager (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 4) or the public – private 
partnership (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011, p. x). Unlike these conventional definitions, 
the Tang and Mazmanian (2010, p. 4) definition is broader, encompassing partnerships 
among local governments, the private sector, civil society, and non-profits. Most 
importantly, the Tang and Mazmanian (2010, p. 4) definition regards collaborative 
governance as a process and not just an institutional arrangement.  
Two forms of collaborative governance can be identified from the extant literature. 
These are  transactive collaborative governance (TCG) and institutionalized collaborative 
governance (ICG).  I refer to TCG in this study as a collaborative arrangement formed 
voluntarily between municipalities, for profit institutions, non-profit institutions and 
special districts for the purposes of ensuring the supply of public goods and services to 
citizens. Feiock (2004, p. 6) observes that “local governments can act collectively to 
create a civil society that integrates a region across multiple jurisdictions through a web 
of voluntary agreements and associations and collective choices by citizens.” An ICG on 
the other hand refers to a cross-jurisdictional institution that has been established by 
statutory mandates to undertake specific tasks. The main structural difference between 
the two forms of collaboration is that TCGs operate as economic exchange arrangements 
while ICGs operate as typical bureaucracies led by a board of directors that includes 
elected city officials and department heads. 
TCGs include typical interlocal service exchanges like pay-for-service 
agreements, joint service agreements and mutual aid arrangements. ICGs are often more 
formalized and include area development districts (ADDs) and regional organizations 
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that unite stakeholders on broader planning and development issues. The Commonwealth 
of Kentucky has fifteen (15) ADDs that serve as a connection between local officials, the 
Governor’s office, state and federal agencies, and private organizations (Kentucky 
League of Cities, 2012). The twenty eight (28) National Estuary Programs (NEPs) 
established under Section 320 of the 1987 Clean Water Act (CWA) to protect and restore 
estuaries of national significance are also examples of ICGs. This study focuses on 
transactive forms of collaborative governance. 
 
United yet Divided: America’s Fragmented State  
America’s local government remains highly fragmented. The 2012 Census of 
Governments reports a total number of 90,056 local governments of which 38,910 (44 
percent) are general-purpose and 51,146 (56 percent) are special–purpose governments. 
For those who embrace fragmentation having many local governments means residents 
can have unlimited access to a variety of urban services (Liesbet & Gary, 2003; 
McGinnis & Ostrom, 2012; V. Ostrom et al., 1961). In his magnum opus, A Pure Theory 
of Local Government Expenditure, Charles Tiebout (1956), a renowned public theorist, 
opined that having many local governments within metropolitan regions promotes 
economic efficiency through competition. Tiebout stressed that fragmentation allows 
residents who are not satisfied with a particular set of services within a particular locality 
to vote with their feet by moving to new jurisdictions. The public choice view has been 
critiqued on a number of grounds. First public choice assumes that just like consumers in 
a private market, residents and jurisdictions have full knowledge on the variety and 
quality of services produced by different jurisdictions. In actuality people are bounded 
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rational when it comes to residential mobility. Public choice also assumes that all public 
services are excludable and so can be sold on the private market. However, the difficulty 
of excluding residents from most public services encourage free riding which hinder the 
private sale of these services (Shrestha, 2005).  
While public choice theorists tout America’s fragmented local government system 
as responsive and efficient, there are others who condemn its relative inefficiencies – 
inequality and environmental spillover (c.f ACIR, 1985, 1987; Downs, 1994; Miller, 
Miranda, Roque, & Wilf, 1995; Nice, 1987; Oakerson, 1999; Parks & Oakerson, 1989, 
1993). Frederickson (1999, p. 702) opined that fragmentation in any form – jurisdictional 
or institutional – constitutes a “disarticulation of the state” which is the greatest challenge 
to an effective system of metropolitan governance.  
Chief amongst those who oppose the public choice view are the consolidationists 
who embrace the idea of having a unified metropolitan government. From the earlier 
writings of Maxey (1922) and Reed (1949) to more recent scholarship from Cisneros 
(1993), Downs (1994) and Rusk (2013), the main arguments cited in favor of   
metropolitan government have been motivated by what these authors perceived as 
inefficiencies and inequalities associated with local government fragmentation. To 
consolidationists, too many local governments means duplication of services, inequality 
and inner city decline. Some have observed that the fragmented system of local 
governments does not provide the “…political leadership, sensitive to the well being and 
interests of [an] the entire region, responsive to socioeconomic problems and planning for 
the future” (Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000, p. 48). Rather, fragmentation inhibits policies 
that address issues of metropolitan scale including economic inequality, inner-city 
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decline, traffic congestion,   air and water pollution (Downs, 1994; Peirce, 1993; Rusk, 
2013). To consolidationists the solution to these inefficiencies lies with a one-size-fits all 
metropolitan government. They perceive that by bringing interjurisdictional activities 
under one government complex issues can be effectively coordinated and dealt with in an 
efficient manner.  
Despite these seemingly positive remarks evidence suggests very few attempts at 
consolidation have been successful (c.f Blomquist & Parks, 1995; A. Brierly, 2004; Carr 
& Feiock, 1999; Feiock et al., 2006; Kelly & Adhikari, 2013; Rosentraub, 2000; Savitch 
et al., 2009) One reason for this lack of success is that consolidation as a form of 
territorial rescaling removes all jurisdictional autonomy, a condition most independent 
cities reject. Additionally, having a unified government has been linked to principal-agent 
and internal coordination problems (Chubb, 1985; Nicholson‐Crotty, 2004). 
 
A Case for Transactive Collaborative Governance 
From the arguments leveled so far against public choice and consolidation it 
stands to reason that for efficiency gains local governments that value their autonomy 
must turn to interlocal collaboration as the next best solution (Rothenberg, 1970; 
Shrestha, 2005).  In line with this thought, new regional scholars have propounded the 
idea of metropolitan governance without government. At the backdrop of their 
proposition were empirical findings that the fates of central cities and suburbs in the post 
industrial era were tied to each other (c.f Adams & Savitch, 1997; Downs, 1994; Hill et 
al., 1995; Ledebur & Barnes, 1992, 1993; Rusk, 2003, 2013; Savitch & Collins, 1992; 
Savitch et al., 1993; Swanstrom, 1996; Voith, 1998; Wikstrom, 2002). New regionalists 
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hold the view that the solutions to today’s public issues require multijurisdictional rather 
than individual efforts. They contend that fragmented forms of local government are not 
efficient in dealing with complex problems of equity, environment, and economy that 
transcend local government boundaries. Instead, intergovernmental networks and 
horizontal linkages offer prospective pathway for solving regional problems including 
fiscal stress, segregation, and central city decline (Downs, 1994; Lowery, 2000; Savitch 
& Vogel, 2000).  
As globalization and information technology continue to alter the meaning of 
physical space, voluntary collaboration and networking, as opposed to traditional 
instruments of power and control are seen as the solutions to problems of the 
disarticulated state (Frederickson, 1999). In their paper, Paths to New Regionalism, 
Savitch and Vogel (2000) highlighted three metropolitan governance frameworks within 
the American local government system. These frameworks, namely multi-tiered, linked 
functions (functional consolidation) and complex networks (overlapping interlocal 
agreements) represent hybrid forms of governance based on collaborative efforts. In the 
view of Savitch and Vogel (2000) the “complex networks” approach is the perfect form 
of metropolitan governance without government.  It is a governance structure that allows 
several local governments to collaborate voluntarily through overlapping webs of 
interlocal agreements without sacrificing their autonomy (Adhikari, 2015; Feiock, 2009; 
Feiock et al., 2004; Oakerson, 2004; Parks & Oakerson, 1989; Savitch & Vogel, 2000). 
Collaboration is however not a substitute for competition. While jurisdictions may 
compete for residents and businesses, the process of attracting these residents and 
businesses need not necessarily be competitive (Adhikari, 2015; Howell‐Moroney, 2008). 
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Even in highly fragmented regions where competition is rife, governance without 
government and competition can still coexist (Adhikari, 2015; V. Ostrom et al., 1961; 
Parks & Oakerson, 2000). 
  
Justification for Research 
In spite of its increasing popularity our understanding of the determinants, 
patterns and relations in collaborative governance remains fairly rudimentary. Previous 
attempts to model the political, economic, and demographic determinants of collaboration 
have in most cases produced inconsistent results, thereby undermining the ability to 
generalize from such findings (Carr et al., 2007; Krueger & McGuire, 2005; Leroux, 
2006; Post, 2002; Rawlings, 2003; Wood, 2004; Zeemering, 2007).  
Perhaps one reason for the lack of consensus in past studies is that most 
researchers relied on the US Census of Government Finance which has not provided 
dyadic information between transacting cities since 2007. Additionally, while most past 
studies have tried to explain collaboration from a purely economic point of view, it is 
becoming clearer in recent studies that local governments pursue different types of 
collaboration for different reasons (Carr et al., 2007). The growing popularity of 
collaborative governance provides a unique opportunity for urban and public 
management scholars to begin to address critical exchange pattern questions that focus on 
the direction (vertical or horizontal collaboration) and number of collaborating partners 
(bilateral or multilateral collaboration) in an agreement. Horizontal collaboration here 
refers to collaborative arrangements involving similar cohorts of local government (Carr 
et al, 2009). Examples include municipalities collaborating with other municipalities, 
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special districts or non-profits on services such as law enforcement, parking and street 
sweeping. Conversely, vertical collaboration refers to collaboration between different 
cohorts of local government. Examples include cities collaborating with counties on 
infrastructure, economic development, emergency planning, animal control, and 
environmental initiatives. A bilateral agreement in this study is one that has only two 
partners of which one is a municipality. It could either be an agreement between two 
municipalities, between a municipality and a county or between a special district and a 
municipality. A multilateral agreement is one that has three or more partners of which at 
least one is a municipality. 
 
Research Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to address gaps in the literature and improve 
our understanding of collaborative governance by examining existing patterns of 
collaboration in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Using Williamson’s (1971) transaction 
cost economics theory and the concept of network embeddedness (Uzzi, 1996) as 
theoretical lenses, I examine collaborative governance by going beyond what already 
exists in current literature – determinants of collaboration– to explore what has barely 
been addressed – patterns if collaboration. This research includes which services are the 
strongest candidates for collaboration, which levels of government are the best candidates 
for partnerships (vertical or horizontal) and what number of partners are appropriate for 
collaborative arrangements (bilateral or multilateral).   
The novelty of this research is both conceptual and spatial. At the conceptual 
level, the research attempts to complement the existing theory of collaborative 
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governance by addressing two (2) main exchange questions – direction and number of 
partners – that have not been thoroughly addressed in previous studies. Spatially, the 
research contributes to the existing practice of regionalism by providing in-depth 
explanation to the structure and nature of exchange patterns in collaborative governance 
networks. 
 
Scope of the Research 
The units of analysis for this study are ‘home rule’ cities in the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky with populations above 230 people. The choice of home rule cities in Kentucky 
was made on the basis of data availability and convenience. The Kentucky Department of 
Local Government maintains an online database which unlike the Census of 
Governments provides information on dyadic relations between collaborating 
municipalities. This information was useful for analyzing vertical and horizontal as well 
as bilateral and multilateral exchanges. The study uses existing data on all interlocal 
agreements signed between years 2000 and 2013 from. A city-by-service cross-sectional 
pooled data was derived from existing agreements signed between years 2000 and 2013 
to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter III. Besides data availability, convenience 
was a key factor in study. The proximity of the selected cities to the University of 
Louisville enabled quick and easier access to city officials in situations where 




Structure of Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II, I review 
the existing theoretical and empirical literature related to collaborative governance and 
highlight the research gaps. I place particular emphasis on three theoretical foundations – 
Mancur Olsen’s (1965) logic of collective action, Williamson’s (1971) transaction cost 
theory and the extant literature on network theory to explicate the relational patterns of 
collaborative governance. Next in Chapter III, I outline the research questions and 
propose six research hypotheses for further enquiry. Additionally I describe in detail the 
research design, dataset and methodology for testing the hypotheses. In chapter IV I 
report in detail the descriptive statistics and binary regression models on the patterns and 
relationships of interlocal collaboration in Kentucky. Next in Chapter V I summarize and 
discuss the main findings of the study and test the research hypothesis in the light of the 
extant theoretical and empirical research. I conclude in chapter VI by discussing the 























In the literature review that follows I explore both the theoretical and empirical 
contexts of collaborative governance. I first identify the theoretical foundations of the 
concept and their connection to the broader public administration and urban affairs 
literature. The theoretical context is drawn from three grounded theories – the logic of 
collective action, transaction cost economics and network theory. The empirical context 
of collaborative governance on the other hand is drawn from the extant literature on 
public management, metropolitan governance and new regionalism.  
 
To Produce or To Provide – A Local Government Dilemma 
The decision to make, buy or collaborate does not only apply to the firm (Coase, 
1937; Geyskens et al., 2006; Gulati et al., 2005; Williamson, 1975). It also serves as one 
of the major administrative dilemmas facing local governments. First envisaged by 
Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961), the idea of a production–provision dichotomy – the 
separation of public service provision from production – helps to redefine economic 
functions in a public service economy. Production requires local communities to go into 
the business of producing local goods and services themselves, while provision includes 
mechanisms such as “contractual arrangements with private firms—or with other public 
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agencies” (V. Ostrom et al., 1961, p. 834). Drawing on V. Ostrom et al’s production-
provision logic, Parks and Oakerson (1989) have propounded what they perceive as a 
system of governance without government in metropolitan regions constituted by local 
‘public economies’. Indeed, Ostrom et al (1961) and Parks and Oakerson (1989) agree 
that by choosing service provision over production local government leaders perform the 
roles of decision makers and service coordinators.  
Based on voter preferences, local governments are charged with the responsibility 
of deciding between what combination of goods and services to produce in-house and 
what to provide through other exchange mechanisms. It is the mission of every local 
government to provide services to its citizens by using available information and 
resources in a very productive and legitimate manner (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011). As 
demonstrated in Figure 1, a rational local government could realize that acting 
independently it may not be able to deliver a particular public service efficiently. Thus it 
would be better off shifting its focus from in-house production to provision. Such 
provision of service could be in the form of collaboration with other jurisdictions or 
contracting out to private institutions. If a local government chooses to collaborate with 
other jurisdictions on services it still has to decide the direction of collaboration as well 





















Source: Author’s Construct based on V. Ostrom et al. (1961), Parks and Oakerson 
(1989), Williamson (1971) 
 
In terms of direction a municipality can choose to collaborate vertically, where 
different levels of government collaborate or horizontal, where the players are local and 
represent multiple interests within a particular region Agranoff and McGuire (2003). 
Beyond bilateral and multilateral arrangements, collaborations can be either bilateral – 
where agreements exists between two local governments – or multilateral – where 
agreements exists between more than two local governments. The freedom to rely on 
these combinations of service delivery arrangements allows local governments to 
maximize efficiency by arriving at the optimal combination of in-house production, 
contracting, and collaborations that provide the optimal satisfaction to citizens.  


















Modes of Exchange in Collaborative Governance  
The different modes of service delivery within the US local government are akin 
to Williamson’s (1991) model of market-hybrid-hierarchy trichotomy. As depicted in 
Figure 2, on one extreme is a typical market economy that operates on arms-length 
contracts. Cities that operate this market form of government provide services to 
residents through either direct purchase from a private producer or through franchise – 
authorizing a private producer to operate a service and charge fees (Shrestha, 2008). On 
another extreme is a hierarchy (consolidated government) that undertakes in-house 
production within a unified governmental structure. Consolidation is a form of territorial 
rescaling, where local governments forgo their individual autonomies in pursuit of 
common regional government agenda (as was the case of the Louisville/Jefferson County 
Metro Government). Nevertheless, evidence suggests that consolidation as a mode of 
government is more popular in theory than in practice. There are few consolidated 
governments in the US today because local governments resist losing their autonomy 
(Brierly, 2004; Carr & Feiock, 2004).  
Between private markets and hierarchies is the domain of collaborative 
governance. Collaborative mechanisms applied here may include pay-for-service 
agreements, mutual aid agreements, joint agreements, voluntary special districts and 
regional partnerships (Shrestha, 2008). The underlying difference in these exchange 
mechanisms is the obvious increase in autonomy as a municipality shifts from market 














Source: Author’s Construct based on Williamson (1991) and Shrestha (2008)  
 
Special districts and regional partnerships are institutionalized forms of 
collaborative governance which are in most cases created through statutory mandates 
(Leroux, 2006). Because these forms of exchange mechanisms are not voluntary, 
participating municipalities have very limited autonomy in decision making (Feiock & 
Scholz, 2010; Gerber & Gibson, 2005). The analyses in this dissertation did not include 
these two forms of collaboration. 
 
Voluntary Interlocal Service Agreements (ILAs) 
Voluntary Interlocal Agreements (ILAs) have been widely researched by different 
disciplines in the past decades (c.f. Andrew, 2009; Andrew & Hawkins, 2012; Andrew et 
al., 2015; Carr et al., 2009; Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; Collins, 2006; Feiock, 2007, 2009; 
Frug, 2002; Gillette, 2001, 2005; LeRoux & Carr, 2007; MacManus & Caruson, 2008; 
Reynolds, 2003; Taylor & Bassett, 2007; Wood, 2006; Zeemering, 2008a). Zeemering 
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(2008a, p. 731) describes ILAs as crucial “features of contemporary local government 
management.” In its basic form, a voluntary ILA is an arrangement established 
voluntarily between local governments for the purposes of producing or providing public 
services across interjurisdictional boundaries. From this logic any ILAs that are crafted in 
response to state mandates and funding requirements are not classified as voluntary and 
therefore not covered under this study. They may either be formal, where contracts are 
signed or informal where agreements are based on trust and a simple handshake (Andrew 
2009a; Atkins 1997). 
Pay-for-service agreements, joint service agreements and mutual aid agreements 
collectively constitute the main voluntary interlocal service agreements adopted by the 
majority of cities and counties in the United States (Advisory Council on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1985; Friesema, 1971; ICMA, 1997; Thurmaier & Wood, 
2002; Zimmerman, 1973). They may exist between only two localities or crafted among 
multiple agencies and local governments (Andrew & Hawkins, 2012). 
A pay-for-service contract comes into effect when a buyer municipality enters 
into a legally binding agreement with a producer municipality such that the buyer 
municipality pays for the delivery of a particular service produced by the producer 
municipality. What differentiates pay-for-service contracts from private contracting is the 
element of integration. Integration refers to the achievement of collaboration between 
organizations. It encompasses not only cooperation (alignment of interest) but also 
coordination (alignment of actions) (Camerer & Knez, 1996, 1997; Foss, 2001; Heath & 
Staudenmayer, 2000). Because private contracting typically involves arm’s length 
bidding processes the interests and actions of the buyer municipality and the private 
19 
 
contractor may not necessarily be aligned. Shrestha (2008) has noted that owing to their 
relatively longer life spans, pay-for-service contracts enable buyer and producer 
municipalities to protect their interests from short term political and administrative 
changes. This is in contrast to private markets where buyer municipalities protect their 
interests by entering into short-term deals so as to take advantage of better future deals in 
the market (Shrestha, 2008).  
A joint service agreement (JSA) is a form of collaboration that allows two or 
more units of government to jointly plan, finance and deliver a service to citizens 
(Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2008). They may include agreement options such as joint 
service provision, sharing of equipment or facilities, joint planning, tax revenues sharing 
and coordination of land-decisions (Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 
1985; Nunn & Rosentraub, 1997; Zeemering, 2008b). A JSA enables individual 
municipalities to contribute to each other’s welfare by contributing resources into a 
generalized pool from which all municipalities obtain benefits. Through a JSA, 
collaborating municipalities are able to cut costs and take advantage of economies of 
scale in the production and provision of public services (Advisory Council on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1985; Collins, 2006; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Morton et 
al., 2008). The difference between a JSA and a pay-for-service contract is that in a JSA 
each participant in an agreement is actively involved in the production of the service, 
whereas in a pay-for-service contract jurisdiction A produces the service with its own 
resources and supplies it to jurisdiction B at a purchase price. The structure of JSAs 
varies in terms of primary tasks, mutual responsibilities and liabilities of collaborating 
parties. Compared to pay-for-service contracts, JSAs are the preferred mode of delivery 
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for most cities and counties in the nation (The Advisory Council on Intergovernmental 
Relations, 1985) 
Mutual aid agreements are service arrangements devised by two or more 
jurisdictions in which each jurisdiction agrees to provide a service to the other at the 
provider’s expense whenever the need arises (Friesema, 1971; Lynn, 2005; Nicholson, 
2007). They form the majority of informal (undocumented) forms of agreements 
available to local governments in the United States. Informal mutual aid agreements 
generally occur as handshake deals among governing officials, verbal confirmations, 
implicit understandings and mutual adjustments – where a city takes into account 
programs of neighboring cities as part of its planning process (Friesema, 1971). Because 
the responsibilities created by mutual aids are established on good faith, they “…are 
operative only when certain conditions come into existence and they remain in operation 
only so long as these conditions are present” (Bollens & Schmandt, 1965, p. 77).  
In a typical mutual aid agreement, jurisdiction A is under no legal obligation to 
provide assistance to jurisdiction B when the need arises especially if providing such aid 
would be injurious to jurisdiction A’s personnel or would reduce jurisdiction A’s capacity 
to provide the service to their own residents (Shrestha, 2008). Friesema (1971) noted that 
although these informal forms of exchange cannot be easily quantified their knowledge 
helps to understand a broader perspective on collaborations in general. The Advisory 
Council on Intergovernmental Relations (1985) has observed that documented contracts 
are more popular amongst cities and counties with larger populations whilst 
undocumented contracts are more common in cities and counties with populations under 
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2,500.  In this study, a collaborating local government is one that uses any one or more of 
these three types of ILAs. 
 
Restrictive vs. Nonrestrictive Interlocal Agreements (ILAs) 
Based on the nature of enforcement mechanisms that go along with an agreement 
two types of ILAs can be identified – restrictive and nonrestrictive. Restrictive ILAs are 
agreements that are generally safeguarded by a binding formal contract to offset 
opportunistic behavior (Andrew & Hawkins, 2012; Gillette, 2001). The contents of an 
ILA may range from simple task descriptions to full details of the nature and scope of 
individual responsibilities. Andrew et al. (2015, p. 403) have suggested that for a 
restrictive ILA to be more effective it must be supported by “…(1) specific state statutes 
or (2) legal or economically defensible local ordinances.”  
There are several advantages of having a restrictive ILA. First a legally binding 
agreement ensures that efforts of all parties are coordinated in a stable and decisive 
manner (Hawkins & Andrew, 2011; Kettl, 2013; Lynn, 2005). Also, by clearly specifying 
the outcomes, rules and regulations of a contract before its inception, ex-post monitoring 
costs are ultimately minimized. Most states (including Kentucky) have statutory 
procedures that help to streamline interlocal collaborative activities of local governments. 
These interlocal collaboration statutes provide information and expectations necessary for 
local governments to make strategic choices (Advisory Council on Intergovernmental 
Relations, 1985; Andrew, 2010).  
Nonrestrictive ILAs are those agreements that are enforced through standards of 
professional norms (Frederickson et al., 2004; Wukich, 2014). Local governments, 
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especially those that belong to a common county, council of government or area 
development district are in constant interaction. Such proximity and regular 
communications help generate trust among partnering local government officials, which, 
in turn, reduces the need for formal control mechanisms (Shrestha & Feiock, 2009; 
Wukich, 2014). Although certain contracting clauses are important to ensure contract 
performance and to hold contracting partners accountable, local governments generally 
have similar goals in the provision of quality urban services. This engenders confidence 
that a contracting partner will not act contrary to expectations or to the detriment of 
another jurisdiction. Another reason why local governments may be motivated to opt for 
nonrestrictive agreements is the cost element associated with restrictive ILAs. Evidently, 
monitoring restrictive ILAs involves enforcement costs. Thus having a flexible less 
restrictive arrangement allows partnering local governments to adapt to local 
circumstances at less to no cost. The disadvantages however lie in the fact that 
nonrestrictive ILAs may lead to “standard principal–agent dilemmas” (Andrew et al., 
2015, p. 403).  
For the purposes of this study I will concentrate solely on restrictive ILAs 
available from the Kentucky Department of Local Government database.  
 
Toward a Theory of Collaboration 
As a concept, collaborative governance draws from several grounded theories 
including group theory (Bentley, 1949), logic of collective action (Olsen 1965), 
prisoner’s dilemma/game theory (Axelrod, 1984; Dawes, 1973), the commons research 
(E. Ostrom, 1990) and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1971). For the purposes 
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of this study I will restrict the review of concepts to the logic of collective action, 
transaction cost economics and network theory.  
 
The Logic of Collective Action  
Collective action as defined by Mancur Olson (1965) in his book, The Logic of 
Collective Action: Public Good and the Theory of Groups, is an action undertaken by a 
group of individuals to provide a good/service for the benefit of everyone in that group. 
The novelty of Olsen’s logic is the revelation that just because all individuals in a group 
would gain from a collective action does not necessarily mean they would act in 
agreement to achieve that objective (Olson, 1965, p. 2). Rational self-interested 
tendencies of humans mean that individuals will often abstain from expending personal 
resources to ameliorate social problems, assuming that someone else will bear the burden. 
This inclination to “free ride” on the actions of others is the essence of the collective 
action problem. In order for individuals to voluntarily contribute resources of time, effort, 
or money to a particular cause, they must hold the perception that the personal benefits of 
doing so will outweigh the costs. The solution, Olson concludes, is small group size, 
coercion or the institution of some other special incentives to make individuals act in 
their common interest.  
Based on Olson’s theory different schools of thought have posited their own 
interpretation of what constitutes collective action. Public choice theorists (e.g., V. 
Ostrom et al., 1961) have opined that individuals have greater voluntary incentives to 
support collective action within smaller homogenous local government jurisdictions than 
within metropolitan governments. This view is different from that of scholars within the 
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metropolitan governance and new regionalism camps (Downs, 1994; Feiock, 2004, 2005; 
Rusk, 2013).  Feiock (2004, p. 6) has argued that “local governments can act collectively 
to create a civil society that integrates regions across multiple jurisdictions through a web 
of voluntary agreements and associations and collective choices by citizens”. Instead of 
competition as the public choice theorists suggest, Feoick contends that local 
governments can simultaneously engage in competitive and cooperative interactions in a 
system of decentralized governance.  
 
Transaction Cost Economics  
Collaboration in any form and at every level involves transactions. For every 
transaction undertaken by individuals, private organizations or public organizations 
(including cities) there are associated costs that differ depending on “…the nature of the 
transaction and on the way that it is organized” (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p. 28).  
Transaction costs can take many forms including search costs, measurement costs, 
administrative costs, information processing costs and maladaptation costs (Williamson, 
2010). These costs emanate from two intrinsic problems – coordination and motivation 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). The coordination problem is mainly a communication 
problem. It occurs when there is difficulty in transmitting information across various 
layers of authority. It may also occur when decision makers have insufficient or 
inaccurate information to make the most cost effective decisions. The motivation problem 
on the other hand results from imperfect commitment from participants in an agreement. 
In situations where it is difficult to motivate partners the prospects of exchange are low. It 
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stands to reason that for efficiency gains, it is best to adopt the exchange arrangement that 
minimizes coordination and motivation problems.  
Ultimately, whether a firm (government) operates as a hierarchy, market or hybrid 
form of institutional structure is largely determined by five related characteristics:  
1. the specificity of investments required to conduct transactions 
2. the difficulty of measuring performance in the transaction  
3. the frequency with which similar transactions occur and the duration or period of 
time over which they are repeated  
4. the complexity of transactions and the uncertainty about what performance will be 
required 
5. the connectedness of the transaction to other transactions (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992) 
 
Network Theory  
Network theory provides another analytical lens for understanding the American 
administrative state. In the field of public administration for example, network analyses 
have often been used to examine (1) the role of public managers (Agranoff & McGuire, 
2001; Mandell & Keast, 2007); (2) decision making and policy outcomes (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003; Mandell & Keast, 2007; Provan & Milward, 2001) and (3) systems of 
public service delivery (O'Toole, 1997; Provan & Milward, 2001).  
In network analyses, collaborative governance may be conceptualized as a system 
of actors (nodes) and relationships (ties) (c.f. Borgatti et al., 2013; Carrington et al., 2005; 
De Nooy et al., 2011; Kadushin, 2012; Newman, 2010; Robins, 2015; Scott, 2012; Scott 
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& Carrington, 2011; Valente, 2010; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Actors are disjoint 
entities such as individuals within a group, departments within a municipality, cities 
within a county or counties within a state (Leroux, 2006; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Relational ties on the other hand are conduits for the flow of material (e.g; funds, 
equipment or personnel) and non-material (e.g; information) resources between actors 
(Leroux, 2006; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Network theory further suggests that 
relational ties are not mutually exclusive. In other words an actor’s position in one set of 
relations may be connected with positions in other networks.  
Unlike transaction cost economics theory that conceptualizes collaboration as a 
purely economic function, network theory relies on social norms, trust and obligations to 
explicate collaborative networks (Lackey et al., 2002; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). 
Frederickson (1999) has observed in the public sector that compared to elected officials, 
administrators tend to work collectively owing to the fact that they share common norms, 
values, rules, and practices. Brown and Potoski (2003, 2005) have further observed that 
past interactions help build trust and credibility which in turn reduce the risk of 
opportunistic behavior.  
 
Theorizing Interlocal Collaboration 
The model of interlocal collaboration adopted in this study draws from Feoick’s 
(2004, 2005, 2013) institutional collective action (ICA) framework. The ICA framework 
combines Olson’s (1965) logic of collective action with Williamson’s (1991) transaction 
cost economics to explicate the circumstances under which local governments and private 
institutions work together in a voluntary manner to solve shared problems. The ICA 
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framework explores transaction risk reduction strategies and examines mechanisms for 
incentivizing and sanctioning voluntary collaboration across jurisdictions and 
organizations (Andrew et al., 2015; Feiock, 2013; Feiock & Scholz, 2010). 
Similar to the ICA framework, the model of collaboration in this study is 
premised on the assumption that local governments are interested in maximizing their 
utility from interlocal exchanges. It further assumes that all other things being equal, 
rational and self-interested local governments are willing to solve mutual problems by 
assessing for themselves the costs and benefits of participating in voluntary exchanges 
compared to private markets or hierarchical exchange mechanisms. Where the benefits of 
interlocal cooperation outweigh the costs, rational and self-interested local governments 
assess the different modes of voluntary interlocal agreements that produce the largest 
utility gains. In a nutshell, local governments will only act collectively if they are 
“…persuaded that their jurisdiction will enjoy benefits in excess of the costs” (Leroux, 
2006, p. 9).  
The ICA framework reveals that collaborating jurisdictions are prone to both ex-
ante and ex-post transaction costs in interlocal exchanges (Andrew, 2008b; Andrew & 
Hawkins, 2012; Feiock, 2013; Hawkins, 2009). Ex-ante transaction costs occur prior to 
the implementation of an agreement. They include costs associated with the lack of 
(asymmetry) information, negotiations, and writing of agreements. Ex-post transaction 
costs occur after the implementation of an agreement. They include costs associated with 
the monitoring and enforcement of agreements against any future conflicts. When 
transaction costs are low, the prospects for institutional collective action are enhanced 
and vice versa. The magnitude of transaction costs is however dependent on the 
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specificity and measurability of the service in question. Services that have low asset 
specificity and at the same time easily measurable have low transaction costs. Such 
services provide opportunities for collaboration (Feiock, 2005).  
Additionally, conditions within the exchange environment such as differences in 
attributes of transacting parties, changes in the exchange conditions as well as behavioral 
and environmental uncertainties can also increase the transaction costs and make 
interlocal exchange riskier (Shrestha, 2008). Safeguarding agreements against such 
potential influences may increase the enforcement costs for participating municipalities. 
Indeed, these transaction risks not only influence the decisions of local governments to 
adopt collaboration but also the extent, direction and pattern of collaboration. The 
sections that follow explain in detail how transaction costs and exchange embeddedeness 
help mitigate the transaction risks in interlocal exchange. 
 
Microanalytics of Transaction Costs in Collaborative Governance 
Governance, according to the “commons” theory (E. Ostrom, 1990), is a means to 
mitigate conflict, infuse order, and thereby realize mutual gains from voluntary exchange.  
Examining the microanalytics of transactions put forward by Williamson (2002) and the 
thesis on alternative paths to new regionalism by Savitch and Vogel (2000) provides a 
theoretical lens for understanding why municipalities engage in different exchange 
mechanisms.  
From the perspective of Savitch and Vogel (2000) collaboration is a reflection of 
the regional path on which a local government is treading. Local governments in the US 
are situated in five regional structures – consolidated regions, multitierd regions, linked 
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functions regions, complex network regions and public choice (polycentric) regions. 
Consolidated and public choice regions are akin to Williamson’s (2002) hierarchy and 
markets respectively while multi-tiered, linked functions and complex network regions 
are akin to hybrids.  The Multi-tiered approach suggests a two-tier governmental 
structure – metropolitan level system maintenance service structure and city level 
lifestyle service structure. The first tier of government represents a single metro wide 
government for “system maintenance” services such as water, sewers and mass transport. 
Whilst the second represents municipal-level management of lifestyle services such as 
parks and recreation, elementary and secondary school education. Linked functions also 
known as functional consolidation is an approach that sustains a pattern of functional 
relations between a city and its county. Relations could be pay-for-service agreements, 
joint service agreements or mutual aid agreements. Complex networks is an approach that 
encourages several independent local government of similar cohort to engage in 
voluntary collaboration through “multiple, overlapping webs of interlocal agreements” 
for their mutual benefit (Savitch and Vogel 2000, 164). From a transaction cost 
perspective the rudiments of identifying these alternative modes of regional governance 
are the attributes of the service being transacted – including asset specificity and service 
measurability.  
 
Asset Specificity  
Asset specificity is the ease with which an asset used for transaction ‘A’ can also 
be used for transaction ‘B’. Where a party makes an investment in assets that cannot be 
easily redeployed to other locations for different users and uses, such an investment is 
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asset specific. The specificity of assets can lead to ‘hold-up’ problems in transactions. 
The more specific a collaborative agreement is, the more dependent the producing party 
is and the higher the risk of opportunistic behavior. Thus transactions that require specific 
investments require strictly enforced contracts to protect parties against early termination 
or renegotiation of the terms of the agreement (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).  
 
Service Measurability 
Service measurability refers to the ease with which service outputs can be 
measured (Brown & Potoski, 2003). It also refers to how costly, impossible or only partly 
possible service outputs can be measured (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Ostrom et al. 
(1961) have observed that where performance can be easily measured, local governments 
are able to streamline the production or provision of a public good and hold producing 
agencies accountable for any inconsistencies in performance. However, where 
performance is difficult to measure it is hard to sanction bad behavior and incentivize 
good behavior. Measurement difficulty therefore creates opportunity for manipulation 
and free riding at others’ cost. As explained by the institutional collective action 
framework, services with outputs that are difficult to measure may be less likely 
candidates for inter-local collaborations because they involve increased transaction costs. 
As measurement difficulty decreases, transaction costs in turn decrease and local 
governments are significantly more likely to collaborate with other local governments. 
But when service outputs become difficult to measure, local governments are 
significantly less likely to collaborate with other local governments.  
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A number of studies on interlocal collaboration have found that transaction costs 
associated with the negotiation, operation and enforcement stages of an agreement are 
major barriers to collaboration (c.f. Andrew, 2008a; Dusin et al., 2009; Feiock & Scholz, 
2010; Kwon & Feiock, 2010; LeRoux et al., 2010; LeRoux & Carr, 2007; Shrestha, 2008; 
Wood, 2008). Studies by Brown and Potoski (2003) and Andrew (2009) and Carr et al. 
(2009) have further indicated that services with high asset specificity and measurement 
difficulty are less likely to be provided through interlocal collaboration because of the 
risk of opportunistic behaviors on the part of collaborating municipalities.   
Some studies have found empirical support for the service measurability 
hypothesis but not asset specificity (e.g. Shrestha, 2008). Yet still others like Andrew 
(2005) have found no evidence in support of either the asset specificity or service 
measurability theses.  
 
Network Embeddedness – How Well Do You Know Your Partner? 
It has been established from TCE theory that information asymmetry represents 
one of the main sources of transaction costs. Unlike the “economic man” who acts 
rationally because he has complete knowledge and anticipates the consequences that will 
follow on each choice, the “administrative man’s” knowledge of consequences in 
transactions is usually fragmentary. In short, the administrative man is bounded rational 
(Simon, 1945). In the absence of complete knowledge, municipalities are bound to make 
decisions on service delivery mechanisms with varying levels of uncertainty. The 
uncertainty associated with the behaviors and actions of collaborating parties leaves room 
for opportunistic behaviors (Feiock, 2013). To offset such opportunistic behaviors, 
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jurisdictions may consider entering into agreements with partners who form part of their 
social network rather than with strangers (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954).  
In his seminal paper; “The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the 
Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect”, Uzzi (1996) explains that 
organizational networks operate in an embedded logic of exchange that promotes 
economic performance through resource pooling, cooperation, and coordinated 
adaptation. This means that to curb both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs due to 
information asymmetry, municipalities can rely on relational mechanisms through 
repeated interaction and reciprocity to facilitate exchange (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 
1996; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995).  
This is because reciprocal and repeated interactions allow local government 
partners to gain first-hand experience about each other’s behavior (Shrestha, 2006; 
Granovetter, 1985). Having access to such behavioral information can serve as a tool for 
controlling each other and thereby limiting any tendencies for opportunistic behavior 
(Shrestha, 2006; Williamson, 1996). The special relations developed from reciprocal and 
repeated interaction over time allows collaborating parties to develop credibility and trust 
(Andrew, 2009; Coleman, 1988; Frederickson et al., 2004; Wukich, 2014) which in turn 
reduce both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs (Olberding, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 
2002; Schneider et al., 2003; Uzzi, 1996). Local governments that interact frequently also 
have the opportunity to develop internal code of conduct and informal communications 
that help to streamline their actions (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Ostrom et al., 1994; 
Parks et al., 1996; Valley et al., 1998).  
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Through this process of exchange embeddedness the behavior of collaborating 
partners becomes more predictable for existing and subsequent exchange (Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999) creating a basis for increased interlocal cooperation (Gerber & Gibson, 
2005). 
 
Towards A New Model of Interlocal Collaboration 
The review of literature so far has explored three grounded theories of 
collaboration – logic of collective action, transaction cost economics theory and the logic 
of network embeddedness. These theories explain how local governments can offset 
transaction risks in interlocal exchanges. Transaction cost theory and the logic of 
collective action are based on the economic assumption of rationality while the logic of 
network embeddedness is based on trust and credibility developed through reciprocity 
and repeated interactions. TCE and the logic of collective action help to explain the 
decision to collaborate but fail to resolve ex-post behavioral uncertainties. On the other 
hand the logic of network embeddedness helps to explicate ex-post behavioral 
uncertainties but fails to provide an economic (cost-benefit) approach to collaboration. 
The model of interlocal exchange adopted in this study thus incorporates elements of all 
three theories to explain exchange patterns and relationships in collaborative governance. 
 
Number of Collaborating Partners: Bilateral vs. Multilateral Relations 
One of the most relevant questions about collaboration regards the effect of the 
number of partners on collaborative behavior. In his magnum opus The Logic of 
Collective Action, Mancur Olson (1965) demonstrated that the number of partners in a 
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group is inversely related to a group’s ability to achieve collective action. In other words 
as the size of a group increases, the probability of the group achieving a collective action 
decreases (E. Ostrom, 2010, p. 157). This thesis, according to Olson, is based on two 
reasons – “the free rider” problem and the problem of high transaction costs. As the size 
of a group increases so does the difficulty of accounting for individual contributions 
towards the provision of a public good. Group members who perceive that their non-
contributions will neither be noticed nor affect the likelihood that a good will be provided 
will free ride. Second, Olson suggests that as group size increases transaction costs 
regarding internal negotiations, writing of agreements and enforcement of agreements 
also increase.  
Following Olson’s influential work, scholars from various disciplines have sought 
to further investigate the effects of group size on collaborative behavior albeit with mixed 
results. Whilst some scholars have found evidence in support of Olson’s position that the 
relationship is negative (c.f. Baland & Platteau, 1999; Dawes et al., 1977; Grujić et al., 
2012; Komorita & Lapworth, 1982; Nosenzo et al., 2013; E. Ostrom, 2005; Vilone et al., 
2014), others have found the relationship to be rather positive (c.f. Agrawal & Chhatre, 
2006; Haan & Kooreman, 2002; Isaac et al., 1994; Masel, 2007; Martin McGuire, 1974; 
Szolnoki & Perc, 2011). Yet still others have found that the relationship between group 
size and collaborative behavior is either ambiguous (c.f. Chamberlin, 1974; Esteban, 
2001; Oliver & Marwell, 1988; Pecorino & Temimi, 2008), non-significant (c.f. Gautam, 
2007; Rustagi et al., 2010; Sandler, 1992) or curvilinear (Agrawal, 2000; Agrawal & 
Goyal, 2001; Chamberlin, 1974; Cinner et al., 2013; Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1970; 
Hardin, 1982; Pecorino, 1999; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Yang et al., 2013). 
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Indeed, the general agreement amongst scholars who support the curvilinear 
hypothesis is that large groups increase transaction costs while small groups usually do 
not possess the resources and capacity required for effective collective action. Thus, 
medium-size groups collaborate better than either small or large groups. Some of these 
scholars have also established that group size and the likelihood of collaboration are 
indirectly related (Chamberlin, 1974; E. Ostrom, 2001). This means that differences in 
group size first influences other variables like one’s marginal contribution in a group, 
which in turn influences collaborative behavior.  
 E. Ostrom (2010) observed that one reason why there have been inconsistent 
patterns in previous literature is the failure of scholars to distinguish between what 
constitutes excludable (substractive) and non-excludable (nonsubstractive) public goods. 
In a substractive public good scenario, the use of a good by individual A reduces the 
benefits for individual B. Thus increasing the number of participants increases the extent 
of “nonoptimality” (E. Ostrom, 2010). In a nonsubstractive public good environment, the 
use of a good by individual A does not impact the benefits individual B receives. 
Increasing the number of participants in a nonsubstractive good environment thus allows 
participants to enjoy a larger collective pool of additional resources. The underlying 
hypothesis is that when “a good has pure jointness of supply, group size has a positive 
effect on the probability that it will be provided” (Marwell & Oliver, 1993, p. 45). 
In interlocal exchanges, local governments are also confronted with the decision 
of choosing between bilateral (two local governments) or multilateral (more than two 
local governments) agreements. A bilateral relationship may be advantageous in certain 
situations because it provides a basis for a more cohesive relationship between 
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transacting jurisdictions in terms of social capital, mutual solidarity, and trust (Coleman, 
1988). Partners involved in bilateral relations are better positioned to gain first-hand 
information and experience about each other (Granovetter, 1985). The prospect of 
repeated dealings further strengthens mutuality between transacting jurisdictions and help 
reduce the prospects of supplier (producer) opportunism.  
However, repeated interaction and familiarity may also serve as an incentive for 
opportunism. A buyer (provider) government concerned with this familiarity problem and 
the potential threat of a single supplier’s (producer) opportunistic behavior may choose to 
enter into an agreement with several suppliers (producers) or several buyers (providers) 
of the same service. Multilateral agreements have an advantage over bilateral agreements 
in that they are less susceptible to interruption in service supply. In situations where one 
supplier government fails to provide a particular service other supplier governments may 
be available to fill the lag in supply. Again, in a multilateral agreement, the credibility of 
a supplier (producer) municipality may serve as a self-restraint against any opportunistic 
temptation (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). There are however certain limitations to multilateral 
agreements. Since administrative (procurement and financial) procedures, number of 
personnel, qualifications and training vary across jurisdictions, negotiating joint service 
and mutual aid agreements can be complex when multiple partners are involved (Haddow 
et al., 2013; Krueger & Bernick, 2010; Scorsone, 2006). 
 
Direction of Collaboration: Vertical vs Horizontal Relations 
Besides choosing the number of potential partners, local governments are also 
confronted with the dilemma of deciding the direction in which to collaborate. They may 
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decide to enter into horizontal agreements with other municipalities, private or nonprofit 
entities or alternatively, they may also be motivated to establish vertical relationships 
with county governments (Andrew et al., 2015). In a heuristic way, Figure 3 shows how 
transaction cost influence the direction of collaboration in different regional 
governance/government structures – markets, complex networks, linked functions, multi-
tiered governments and consolidations (Savitch & Vogel, 1996).  
 
Figure 3 



























Source: Author’s construct based on Williamson (2002, p. 181), Savitch and Vogel 





















Asset Specificity / Service Measurability  
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As shown in Figure 3, the burdens of bureaucracy make consolidated 
governments more costly at k0. From asset specificities k0 to k1 public choice m(k) is more 
cost effective than collaborative governance g(k) and consolidation q(k) by reason of its 
flexibility and adaptability. Beyond asset specificity k1, collaborative governance g(k) 
becomes more cost effective than public choice m(k) and consolidation q(k). Local 
governments are therefore better off with collaborative governance, g(k) at this stage. 
Collaborative governance mechanisms could either be complex networks, linked 
functions or multi-tiered. Within these three strata of collaborative governance, complex 
networks are the closest to public choice and so attract lower asset specificities. Multi-
tiered governments are associated with higher asset specificities because they are closest 
to consolidation. Beyond k2 where asset specificity is at an optimum level, local 
jurisdictions are likely to adopt consolidation q(k) as it becomes less costly than public 
choice m(k) and collaborative governance g(k). In other words m(k) > g(k) > q(k) because 
consolidated governments have successfully coordinated and adapted to the transaction 
process at this stage. This illustration indicates that collaborative governance is most 
advantageous at intermediate range of asset specificity (k1 < k2). It also indicates that 
within collaborative governance g(k), jurisdictions have a choice of interacting 
horizontally – with local governments of comparable powers – or interacting vertically – 
with local governments of different powers (Kenyon & Kincaid, 1991). From Figure 3, it 
can be inferred that at lower levels of asset specificity cities are better off engaging in 
horizontal collaborations. As asset specificities increase, jurisdictions may turn towards 
vertical collaboration (with a county for example) for efficiency gains.  
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This rudimentary setup can also be extended to explicate the impact of service 
measurability on collaborative behavior. The basic argument propounded here is that 
vertical collaboration is preferred to horizontal collaboration as a public service becomes 
highly asset specific and difficult to measure, ceteris paribus. Prior studies have found 
that when municipalities rely on vertical collaboration they gain from higher levels of 
regulatory enforcement and a minimal cost of monitoring potential defectors (Andrew, 
2009; Feiock, 2007, 2009; Scholz & Wang, 2006).  
 
Determinants of Interlocal Collaboration: Empirical Background  
Over the past two decades there have been a series of attempts to find empirical 
explanations to the factors that determine interlocal collaboration. Despite these attempts 
scholars are yet to agree on a general theory or model of collaboration. Some of the 
variables that have been examined in prior research include asset specificity, service 
measurability, labor/capital intensity, reciprocity and recurrence of exchange. Other 
demand-side factors such as local fiscal capacity, changes in a local government’s 
population, the amount of personal income, property wealth of residents, form of 
government, demographic characteristics and social networks have equally been 
empirically tested by different scholars albeit with inconclusive results (e.g. Krueger & 
McGuire, 2005; Leroux, 2006; Post, 2002; Rawlings, 2003; Shrestha, 2008; Wood, 2006; 
Zeemering, 2007). Granted that results from prior studies are inconclusive, it is worth 
finding out if the variables that have been tested elsewhere in the US are significant 
determinants in the case of Kentucky.  




Fiscal Factors              
For a long time fiscal capacity has remained the number one cited determinant of 
interlocal collaboration (e.g. Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1985; 
Bartle & Swayze, 1997; Krueger & McGuire, 2005; Leroux, 2006; MacManus & 
Caruson, 2008; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Sonenblum et al., 1977; Stein, 1990).  Studies 
highlighting fiscal capacity have often suggested that governments faced with depleting 
property tax base and state funding are better off engaging in interlocal collaboration 
rather than in-house production (Carr et al., 2007). Prior studies stressed further that by 
entering into collaborative agreements local governments are able to achieve cost savings 
and scale economies  on services that are mostly capital intensive or have high start-up 
costs (Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991).  
Notwithstanding these supporting arguments, empirical testing of the fiscal 
capacity variable by different scholars has produced mixed results (e.g. Adhikari, 2015; 
Bartle & Swayze, 1997; Krueger & McGuire, 2005; Stein, 1990; Wood, 2004). Those 
who have found empirical support for the hypothesis include Wood (2004) and Krueger 
and McGuire (2005). In a study of 46 city managers in the Kansas City Metropolitan 
Area, Wood (2004) found that eighty (80) percent of the cities using interlocal 
agreements achieved cost savings whilst eighty three (83) percent achieved economies of 
scale. In similar study of 2,825 U.S. cities, Krueger and McGuire (2005) found that tax 
revenue per capita and federal grants per capita were significant in determining both the 
decision to collaborate and the extent of collaboration.  
Other studies have demonstrated that fiscal capacity in terms of per capita taxable 
value does not significantly influence the decisions to collaborate even when 
jurisdictional differences in population, land area, and demographic characteristics are 
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considered (e.g. Carr et al., 2007; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Thurmaier, 2005; 
Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). Yet still, others have shown that cities participate in 
collaborative arrangements irrespective of fiscal capacity. In a study of 1,290 local 
governments in Iowa Thurmaier (2005) for instance found that local governments do not 
necessarily engage in collaborative exchanges because they want to cut production costs. 
Rather, local governments collaborate because they want to ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness (managerial values) in service delivery.  
Obviously, this variability of findings results from the lack of a standard measure 
of fiscal capacity. Prior studies have often used different measures including local 
property tax per capita, personal income per capita, and government spending as proxies 
for fiscal capacity. It is however not clear whether these proxies accurately capture the 
true financial situations of the municipalities they study.  
 
Labor Intensive versus Capital Intensive Services 
Findings from prior research suggest that the decision to collaborate is also 
largely influenced by the characteristics of the service in question. One of such 
characteristics is the labor intensity – capital intensity dichotomy. Labor intensive 
services are services that require continuous levels of staffing. Examples include police, 
fire corrections and health services. Because production costs for labor intensive services 
do not decrease as volumes increase, realizing economies of scale in labor intensive 
services is difficult (Leroux, 2006). Capital intensive services on the other hand are 
services that have high start-up costs. Examples include highway construction, housing, 
parks, sewage, gas and water distribution. Capital intensive equipments and materials are 
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usually less expensive when purchased in large quantities thus they tend to produce 
economies of scale. The general argument therefore is that local governments are more 
likely to collaborate on services that are capital intensive, and less likely to collaborate on 
services that are labor intensive. In a study of 140 metropolitan areas, Post (2002) found 
that while both labor intensive and capital intensive service related collaborations occur 
in almost all geographically dense regions, collaborations in capital-intensive services 
occur at higher rates than labor-intensive services. 
 
System Maintenance versus Lifestyle Services 
  In his book, Metropolitan Political Analysis: A Social Access Approach, Oliver 
Williams (1971) drew attention to what he perceived as the “lifestyle model” of 
metropolitan service delivery. The lifestyle model dichotomizes public services provided 
in metropolitan areas as either systems maintenance functions or lifestyle functions. 
Systems maintenance functions are services that provide the needed infrastructure 
essential for maintaining the health and safety of residents. These include sewer, water 
distribution, solid waste disposal, storm water management, and roads. Lifestyle services 
are services that usually influence residential location decisions (Andrew et al., 2015). 
They include services that provide comfort and satisfaction to a select group of residents, 
particularly residents of upper-middle class suburbs who enjoy affluent lifestyles. 
Lifestyle goods include parks and recreation.  
At the regional level, this dichotomy of services suggests a two-tier governmental 
structure – metropolitan level system maintenance service structure and city level 
lifestyle service structure. The first tier of government represents a single metro wide 
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government for “system maintenance” services such as water, sewers and mass transport. 
Services provided at this level require a vertical form of collaboration (see Figure 1) 
between local governments and a county or consolidated government. The second 
represents municipal-level management of lifestyle services such as parks and recreation, 
elementary and secondary school education. Lifestyle service structures require 
horizontal forms of collaboration between local governments, service districts, for-profits 
and non-profits.  
A number of studies (Rawlings 2003; Wood 2004; LeRoux 2006) have employed 
Williams's (1971) social access model to explain interlocal collaboration based on the 
general hypothesis that public managers are more likely to collaborate on “system 
maintenance” services than they would on “lifestyle” services. The assumption here is 
that cities are more likely to make efficiency gains and enjoy economies of scale by 
delivering system maintenance services on a larger scale than lifestyle services. But here 
again empirical findings have been inconclusive. Some studies (e.g. Julnes & Pindur, 
1994; Rawlings, 2003; Savitch & Vogel, 1996) found interlocal service collaboration to 
be much more common for systems maintenance functions than lifestyle services. Others 
(e.g. Wood, 2006) found no supporting evidence. 
In his study of 1,848 collaborative service delivery arrangements among 46 cities 
and counties in the Kansas City Metropolitan area Wood (2006) found no evidence to 
support the notion that local governments are mostly inclined to collaborate on systems 
maintenance functions than lifestyle goods. He noted rather that collaboration for lifestyle 
goods and services occur at almost the exact same rate as cooperation for systems 




Form of Local Government  
To a large extent, the decision to produce or provide a service is very political. 
This is why the form of government – Mayor Council, Commission or Council Manager 
– is an important factor for explaining decisions to participate in interlocal collaboration 
(Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Sonenblum et al., 1977). The council-manager form of 
government in particular has been identified as a very significant predictor of 
collaboration because of the common values and norms city managers share (Bartle & 
Swayze, 1997; Krueger & McGuire, 2005; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Thurmaier & 
Wood, 2002; Wood, 2006).  
In a strict sense elected public officials like mayors and councilmen are not as 
administrative minded as city managers. As public administrators, city managers perform 
the role of public entrepreneurs promoting new innovations whilst generating political 
support. Frederickson (1999) notes that public administrators are able to perform this 
entrepreneurial role because they usually have a long tenure compared to other elected 
city officials. They therefore hold shared professional values and norms that are geared 
towards development. This inner drive motivates them to cooperate with each other as 
long as it leads to the development of their respective municipalities. In addition to 
Fredrickson’s position, Stein (1990) surmises that professional administrators are also 
motivated to collaborate in order to enhance their professional reputation. 
Other findings indicate that although influential, the council-manager form of 
government is only significant in cases of private contracting but not for interlocal 





Prior studies have noted that the ‘‘the decision calculus of local leaders’’ is often 
influenced by the legal environment within which their municipalities exist (Krueger & 
Bernick, 2010, p. 714). Thus state legal environments can either support or inhibit 
collaborative efforts. Local governments that exist in home rule states for example have 
the autonomy to decide which possible combinations of service delivery methods are 
beneficial to its citizens. Additionally, the presence of an Interlocal Cooperation Act 
provides the legal backing required to reduce the potential risks of opportunism in 
interlocal collaborations. Municipalities that have this legal backing are more confident to 
engage in interlocal agreements.  
Prior studies that examine the limiting aspects of state laws have however 
surmised that instruments like state mandates and conditional grants-in-aid tend to 
promote competition and conflict rather than collaboration among autonomous 
jurisdictions (McEntire & Dawson, 2007; Volden, 2007). 
 
Resident Income Levels 
Previous research has also examined the influence of residents’ income levels on 
collaborating patterns (c.f. Leroux, 2006; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Shrestha, 2008). 
The notion that low income levels are a general indication of poverty and fiscal stress is 
the basis for the resident income hypothesis. Just like the fiscal capacity hypothesis, the 
prevailing argument here is that communities with majority low income residents are 
more likely to collaborate rather than produce services in-house. The reverse is also true 
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for communities with high median incomes. Communities that are wealthy are more 
likely to produce services in-house because they can afford them.  
Yet again, empirical evidence shows that the conventional median income 
hypothesis is inconclusive. In a study of public safety services for example Andrew 
(2010) found that high median household incomes are linked to less reliance on interlocal 
collaboration. Other studies by Morgan and Hirlinger (1991), LeRoux and Carr (2007) 
and Leroux (2006) have shown that the relationship between per capita income and 
interlocal collaboration is nonlinear. This means that both wealthy and poor communities 
are equally likely to use interlocal contracting arrangements. In the case of wealthy 
communities collaboration occurs because they can afford to experiment with alternative 
service delivery arrangements (Leroux, 2006).  
 
Density of Local Governments 
The density of local governments is another factor that has been identified in 
previous studies as a determinant of interlocal collaboration. Post (2004) has noted that 
the higher the density of local governments in an area the higher the potential for policy 
spillovers. Interlocal collaboration serves as a control mechanism against free-riding in 
such instances. The density of local governments also impacts the transaction costs 
(negotiation, operation, enforcement) of collaboration. Where local government densities 
are low, proximity to collaborating partners is limited which may increase the cost of 
negotiations, operations and enforcement of agreements. The reverse is also true when 





Local government decision-makers interact and share information on a daily basis 
at the professional and social levels. Memberships of associations like the International 
City and County Management Association (ICMA), Council of Governors (COG), Area 
Development Districts (ADDs), League of Cities and a host of other regional 
organizations enable municipalities to share common norms, values, rules, and practices. 
These relationships help build trust which is critical for interlocal collaboration (Kettl, 
2013; Roberts, 2008). Thurmaier and Wood (2002) have shown empirically, that social 
relations among city managers positively influence interlocal collaboration. Similarly, 
Brown and Potoski (2003) and Lackey et al. (2002) have shown that where administrators 
belong to similar professional associations they tend to collaborate.  
Based on the theory of network homophily (Lazarfeld and Merton, 1954), also 
known as “like-me” hypothesis, other researchers have hypothesized that municipalities 
are more likely to interact with those whom they have more in common. Empirical 
evidence on this logic is however been mixed. Similar to previous findings by Dye, 
Leibman, Williams and Herman (1963) five decades ago, Foster (1998) has found that 
central cities and suburbs that share common social and economic characteristics are 
more likely to collaborate in a number of services than are central cities and suburbs with 
dissimilar attributes. More recent studies have shown that having similar social and 
economic characteristics only influences collaboration under less restrictive contractual 
arrangements (Andrew, 2009).  In a study of interlocal public safety agreements in 
Florida, Andrew and Hawkins (2012) found that communities that have similar levels of 
median income are more likely to collaborate under mutual aid agreements. He also 
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found that contrary to the ICA proposition, racial heterogeneity rather than homogeneity 
encourages collaboration. In his analysis he found that communities with a higher 
percentage of white population were more likely to enter into agreements that have 
localities with a lower percentage of white residents. 
 
Research Gaps 
Given the fact that contemporary public management theory has accepted the 
principle that managers must operate across organizations (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003) 
and that solving seemingly complex social problems of today require mechanisms that 
are more inclusive and more adaptable (Alter & Hage, 1993), an in-depth study on the 
exchange relationships and patterns in collaborative governance  is a worthy exercise.  
Similar to Andrew’s (2009) previous observation there are currently three 
dominant research approaches to understanding the dynamics of voluntary interlocal 
collaboration. The first approach addresses interlocal collaboration as one of the many 
alternatives of service delivery, including in-house production, provision by private 
enterprises, provision by county, and provision by other municipalities (Brown & 
Potoski, 2003; Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; LeRoux & Carr, 2007). The likelihood of a 
municipality choosing to collaborate or otherwise is treated as a variable which is 
dependent on other social, economic and political explanatory variables. Scholars who 
adopt this approach often theorize with Williamson’s (1971) transaction cost economics 
or Feoick’s (2005, 2009, 2013) institutional collective action framework. A second 
approach draws on network values such as credibility, trust and reciprocity to explain 
how different interlocal networks foster and support collaboration (Andrew, 2009; 
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Shrestha, 2010; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). The third approach relies on more qualitative 
case studies and interviews to explore the internal dynamics of collaboration (Taylor & 
Bassett, 2007; Zeemering, 2008a).  
A review of literature on the three dominant research approaches has revealed 
inconclusive evidence on why local governments and institutions choose to collaborate. 
Specifically, the review of literature has shown that prior studies are limited in the 
following ways: 
 
1) A limited number of researches exist that analyze the determinants of collaboration 
for different public services (e.g., public safety, economic development, infrastructure 
etc).  
2) A limited number of researches exist that examine the determinants of collaboration 
based on the number of collaborating partners (e.g., bilateral versus multilateral 
relations) 
3) A limited number of researches exist that examine the determinants of collaboration 
based on direction (vertical versus horizontal relations). Although in recent times 
research. 
 
This dissertation will address these gaps by analyzing the patterns of collaboration on 





Collaborative governance has gained popularity over the past two decades. There 
have been a series of attempts to find empirical explanations to the question of what 
factors determine interlocal collaboration. Whilst some progress has been made by 
scholars in answering this question there is yet to be consensus on a general methodology 
and theory of collaboration. Beside asset specificity, service measurability, reciprocity 
and recurrence of exchange, other factors including fiscal capacity, labor/capital 
intensity, form of government, demographic characteristics and social networks have 
been empirically tested by different scholars albeit with inconclusive results.  Although 
results from these studies are inconclusive, it is worth finding out if these factors are 
significant determinants in the case of Kentucky. The next section outlines the research 
























RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with an outline of the research questions for the study. Based 
on the extant theoretical and empirical research, six hypotheses are derived to answer 
these research questions. The final part of the chapter outlines a study design and 
methodology for operationalizing the research hypotheses.  
 
Research Questions  
The objective of this research is to address some of the gaps identified in the 
theoretical and empirical research. Following the literature review in chapter II, the 
following research questions have been identified for further enquiry:  
 
1. Direction of Collaboration 
o On what services do cities mostly collaborate vertically?  
o On what services do cities mostly collaborate horizontally?  
o Which network factors have the strongest influence on a city’s decision to 
collaborate with other cities (horizontal collaboration)?  
o Which network factors have the strongest influence on a city’s decision to 
collaborate with a county (vertical collaboration)?  
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2. Number of collaborating partners 
o On what services do cities mostly collaborate bilaterally?  
o On what services do cities mostly collaborate multilaterally?  
o Which network factors have the strongest influence on a city’s decision to 
collaborate with only one partner – city, county, special district, non profit or 
for-profit (bilateral collaboration)?  
o Which network factors have the strongest influence on a city’s decision to 
collaborate with two or more partners (multilateral collaboration)?  
 
 Hypotheses  
Consistent with prior research that utilizes the transaction cost (Andrew, 2009; 
Andrew & Hawkins, 2012; Carr et al., 2009; Feiock & Scholz, 2010; Hawkins, 2009) and 
network embededdness (Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2005) theory my central argument in 
this study is that a municipality’s direction of collaboration and the number of 
collaborating partners are largely influenced by (a) the characteristics of the services and 
(b) the embeddedness of its network.  
Six (6) research hypotheses have been developed from this general argument to 
address the questions raised in the previous section. A list of these hypotheses and their 
theoretical and empirical justifications are provided in the sections that follow. 
 
Hypotheses Examining the Direction of Collaboration 
The literature review in chapter II established that municipalities are confronted 
with the challenge of deciding what direction they want to collaborate. Savitch & Vogel’s 
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(1996) three typologies of regional governance suggest that jurisdictions have a choice of 
interacting horizontally – with local governments of comparable powers – or interacting 
vertically – with local governments of different powers. Furthermore, the literature has 
established that the decision to collaborate or not also depends on the characteristics of 
the service in question such as asset specificity and service measurability (Brown & 
Potoski, 2003, 2005; Carr et al., 2009; Feiock, 2007; Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Shrestha, 
2010; Williamson, 1985, 2010).  When an investment made in a particular locality is 
difficult to redeploy to another location or reusable for another purpose such an 
investment is considered to have high asset specificity. To offset any opportunistic 
behaviors on the part of partners, local governments may be better off collaborating 
vertically on asset specific services.  
Service measurability refers to the difficulty associated with measuring and 
monitoring the outcomes of services delivered (Brown & Potoski, 2003). Service 
outcomes that are relatively difficult to measure carry greater uncertainty. Thus at higher 
levels of service measurability cities are better off engaging in vertical collaborations. As 
services become easy to measure, jurisdictions may turn towards horizontal collaboration. 
Based on these arguments I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Cities are more likely to collaborate vertically on services that have high 
levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Cities are more likely to collaborate horizontally on services that have 
lower levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty. 
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Hypotheses Examining the Number of Collaborating Partners 
Review of both theoretical (Coase, 1937; Feiock, 2005, 2008, 2013; Williamson, 
1991) and empirical (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2008) literature 
has demonstrated that transaction costs associated with information search, negotiations, 
and enforcement of negotiations are hindrances to collaboration.  The literature has 
further indicated that the magnitude of these transaction costs is dependent on the 
specificity or measurability of the service in question. Where assets are specific in 
transactions, redeployment is difficult and the likelihood of opportunistic behavior is 
high. In the same vein, where services outputs are difficult to measure, costly, impossible 
or only partly possible to measure (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), it is hard to provide 
effective incentives or sanctions. The resultant effect is opportunistic behavior.  
The extant literature on collective action has also demonstrated that the number of 
partners in a collaborative arrangement has an indirect relation with collaborative 
behavior (Chamberlin, 1974; E. Ostrom, 2001). The number of partners in a collaborative 
arrangement first influences latent factors like asset specificity and service measurability, 
which in turn influence collaborative behavior. Where services have high levels of asset 
specificity and measurement difficulty cities are better off with multilateral agreements. 
In a large group any costs associated with opportunistic behavior are distributed amongst 
all members. The final cost burden carried by a participating city therefore becomes low. 
Based on these arguments I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Cities are more likely to collaborate multilaterally on services that have 
higher levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty. 
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Hypothesis 4: Cities are more likely to collaborate bilaterally on services that have lower 
levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty.   
 
Hypotheses Examining Network Embededness 
The theory of network embededdness in public administration suggests that the 
primary impulse of cities to collaborate is not purely based on economic reasons but 
rather the innate tendency to establish norms of reciprocity (Lackey et al., 2002; 
Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). This argument is consistent with Frederickson’s (1999) 
administrative conjunction thesis that surmises that administrators tend to work 
collectively owing to the fact that they share common norms, values, rules, and practices. 
Empirical evidence from recent studies also point to the fact that social relations among 
city managers and specialists such as being part of the same council of governments tend 
to support the use of interlocal agreements (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Lackey et al., 2002; 
Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). According to Brown and Potoski (2003, 2005), previous 
interactions build trust and credibility which ultimately reduce the risk of opportunistic 
behavior. This is especially relevant in agreements where services are asset specific, and 
difficult to measure.  
Social network theory also suggests that a local government’s position in one set 
of relations can further reinforces positions in other sets of relationships. That is to say 
that past collaborations within a network can breed future collaborations due to trust and 
credibility. In line with these arguments I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 5: Repeated interaction in the past between transacting jurisdictions 
increases the likelihood of collaboration. 
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Hypothesis 6: Collaboration in other service areas has a positive effect on the likelihood 
of collaborating on the service in question. 
 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the transaction characteristics of services included in 
this study. It also shows the expected patterns of collaboration. 
 
Table 3.1 
Characteristics of Services and Expected Pattern of Collaboration 






Public Safety  
Emergency 911 Radio Communications  HA_EM Vertical Multilateral 
Emergency Medical Response (EMS)  LA_DM Vertical Multilateral 
Fire Protection & Response HA_DM Vertical  Multilateral 
Police Protection/ Law Enforcement  HA_DM Vertical Multilateral 
Emergency Disaster Planning  HA_DM Vertical Multilateral 
 
Economic Development  
Planning, Zoning, Building Inspection 
&Code Enforcement  
HA_DM Vertical Multilateral 
Financing/Economic Development  LA_EM Horizontal Bilateral 
Enterprise Zone & Industrial 
Development  
HA_DM Vertical Multilateral 
Tax Collection & revenue sharing  HA_EM Vertical Multilateral 
Parks and Recreation/ Tourism  LA_DM Vertical Multilateral 
Equipment Sharing LA_EM Horizontal Bilateral  
Information sharing/ Human Resources 
Sharing  
LA_EM Horizontal  Bilateral 
 
Infrastructure  
Housing & energy  HA_EM Vertical Multilateral  
Cable & internet  HA_EM Vertical Multilateral 
Sewer System  HA_EM Vertical Multilateral 
Telecommunications  HA_EM Vertical Multilateral 
Water  HA_EM Vertical Multilateral 
HA_DM: High Asset Specificity, Difficult to Measure    HA_EM: High Asset Specificity, Easy to Measure
LA_DM: Low Asset Specificity, Difficult to Measure     LA_EM: Low Asset Specificity, Easy to Measure
Source: Author’s Construct based on Brown and Potoski (2001 p. 31) and Andrew and 




The study is mostly quantitative. Hypotheses 1 to 4 are analyzed using descriptive 
statistics whilst hypotheses 5 to 6 are analyzed using binary logistic regressions.  
 
Units of Analysis 
The analyses cover all ‘home rule’ cities in Kentucky with populations above 230 
people. It excludes larger jurisdictions like Louisville Jefferson County Metro and 
Lexington Fayette Urban County governments. These two governments were left out of 
the study because their population sizes and government structure could potentially affect 
the variability in the data. Additionally, the service provision relationships between the 
consolidated Louisville Metro government and independent municipal governments 
within the consolidated entity are legally determined rather than the product of voluntary 
collaborative behavior. Cities of population below 230 were also left out of the analysis 
because sparsely populated municipalities are generally known to rely heavily on their 
counties for services, thereby limiting their potential for collaboration. Thus out of the 
three hundred and thirty four (334) incorporated cities in Kentucky, two hundred and 




In this study, collaborative governance is examined under three service functions 
namely; public safety, economic development and Infrastructure. Public safety in 
particular is important to study because it is one of the major components of local 
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government budgets (Carr & LeRoux, 2005). Economic development and infrastructure 
were included in the study because they represent the core service agreements in 
Kentucky beside public safety. Other relevant local governments services like public 
works (road maintenance, snow plowing, street sweeping) and waste management (solid 
waste disposal and recycling) were excluded from this research because evidence 
suggests that most municipalities including the ones in Kentucky usually outsource these 
services to private contractors.  
Interlocal service agreement data on public safety, economic development and 
infrastructure were sourced from the Kentucky Department of Local Government 
(KDLG) online database. Pursuant to KRS 65.210 – 65.300 (the Interlocal Cooperation 
Act), all interlocal cooperation agreements entered into between cities, counties, charter 
counties, urban-county governments, and sheriffs (and any combination thereof) are 
submitted to the Department of Local Government for approval. The KDLG data 
provides specific information on the nature and content of all collaborative agreements 
including: 
(1) The name of the service to be performed;  
(2) Collaborating parties involved;  
(3) The location of the service to be performed;  
(4) The means of payment of the cost of the service  
 
Of the six hundred and forty eight (648) interlocal agreements reported by the Kentucky 
Department of Local Government between years 2000 and 2013, three hundred and sixty 
two (362) representing 55.9 percent were selected and used in the analyses. The 
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remaining two hundred and eighty six (286) agreements that were left out of the analyses 
were either inter-county agreements, grant based agreements or agreements between any 
of the 119 cities excluded from the study. 
Data pertaining to median income and population were sourced from the US 
Census Bureau. Data on local government fiscal capacity was sourced from the annual 
financial reports from the cities submitted to the Department of Local Government and 
retained and distributed by the Kentucky League of Cities. 
 
Research Design 
The hypotheses in this study were tested as two separate but reinforcing parts. 
Hypotheses 1 to 4 address general transaction characteristics (asset specificity and service 
measurability) while hypotheses 5 and 6 address network embeddedness. Consistent with 
Brown and Potoski (2001, 2003, 2005) and Andrew & Hawkins (2012) the services were 
examined under four transaction characteristics: (1) low asset specificity and low service 
measurability, (2) high asset specificity and high service measurability, (3) low asset 
specificity but high service measurability, and (4) high asset specificity but low service 
measurability. Appendix 1 provides details of services under each category.  
Descriptive statistics were used to measure the degree to which the four 
transaction characteristics fall under vertical, horizontal, bilateral and multilateral 
collaborations.  Similar methodological approaches have been utilized by Dustin, Jones 
and Levine (2009) in their extensive study of local government collaboration in Ohio as 
well as Caruson and MacManus (2010) in their study of interlocal emergency 
management collaboration in Florida. Hypotheses 5 and 6 were examined using a binary 
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logistic model. The sections that follow explain the variables and statistical tests used in 
analyzing hypotheses 5 and 6. 
 
Variables 
Four variables, each addressing the mode of collaboration (vertical, horizontal, 
bilateral, multilateral), serve as dependent variables in the analyses. Not participating in 
any mode of service delivery serves as the reference category in all models. The 
dependent variables were examined under three service categories: (1) public safety (2) 
economic development and (3) infrastructure development. Table 3.1 provides details of 
the services included in each service category.  
Service agreements amongst cities are not mutually exclusive; this means that a 
city may collaborate with another city in law enforcement whilst collaborating with 
another city on fire service. Where a city maintains two or more agreements in a service 
category, one service was randomly selected and used in the analyses. In public safety, 
thirty (30) samples were selected under bilateral collaboration; twenty four (24) samples 
were selected under multilateral collaborations; forty eight (48) samples were selected 
under vertical collaborations while six (6) samples were selected under horizontal 
collaborations. In economic development thirteen (13) samples were selected under 
multilateral collaborations; twelve (12) samples were selected under bilateral 
collaborations; eleven (11) samples were selected under vertical collaborations while 
three (3) samples were selected under horizontal collaborations. Finally, in infrastructure, 
seven (7) samples were selected under multilateral collaborations; sixteen (16) samples 
were selected under bilateral collaborations; twenty five (25) samples were selected 
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under vertical collaboration while one (1) sample was selected under horizontal 
collaboration.  
Two (2) predictor variables were included in the model to explain the dependent 
variables in each of the three (3) service categories. These predictor variables are 
collaborations in other services and repeated interaction. Control variables in the model 
are variables that appeared as predictors of interlocal collaboration in previous studies 
(Carr et al., 2007; Leroux, 2006; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Post, 2002, 2004; Shrestha, 
2008). They are fiscal capacity, county density, city population, median household 
income, county seat and form of government. Table 3.2 provides a summary of all 

















Table 3.2  
Summary of Variables 
Variables  Variable Construction 
 
Dependent Variables 
Direction of service delivery 
(vertical / horizontal)  
 
No. of Collaborating partners 
(bilateral / multilateral) 
 
 
A dichotomous variable scored 1 when a city uses a 
particular mode of delivery, 0 otherwise 
 
Predictor Variables  
Collaboration in other services Number of other services a city is collaborating in. 
Repeated interaction 
 
The number of years a city has been collaborating 
Controls  
Fiscal Capacity Cities’ own source revenue measured in dollars per  
capita (Kentucky League of Cities, 2015) 
Density of municipalities 
 
The number of municipalities in a City’s county per 
square 100 square miles 
 
City population A city’s population in thousands transformed into 
natural log (American Community Survey 5 Year Data, 
2009 - 2013) 
 
Median household income 
 
Natural log of median household income in dollars 
(American Community Survey 5 Year Data, 2009 - 
2013) 
 
County seat A city that also serves as seat of county government 
(Kentucky League of Cities) 
 
Form of government A dichotomous measure indicating whether a city has 
council mayor (1) or otherwise (0). 
Source: Author’s construct, 2016 
 
Measures of the Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Two variables addressing interlocal collaboration in terms of number of partners 
(bilateral and multilateral) and two variables addressing interlocal collaboration in terms 
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of direction (vertical and horizontal) were used as dependent variables. A bilateral 
agreement in this study is one that has only two partners of which one is a municipality. It 
could either be an agreement between two municipalities, between a municipality and a 
county or between a special district and a municipality. A multilateral agreement is one 
that has three or more partners of which at least one is a municipality. A vertical 
agreement is one that has at least one city and one county partner. A horizontal agreement 
is one that has at least two local governments. Available data on interlocal agreements 
from the Kentucky Department of Local Government website provided indication of 
which agreements are bilateral, multilateral, vertical or horizontal.  
 
Predictor Variables 
Two (2) predictor variables derived from the theoretical and empirical literature 
on exchange relations are included in the model. These variables are other collaborations 
and repeated interaction.  
A review of the literature on social network theory suggested that a local 
government’s position in one set of relations could further reinforce positions in other 
sets of relationships (Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2005). This means that if city A 
collaborates with city B on law enforcement, city A is likely to collaborate with city B or 
any other local government (city or county) on emergency services. Put in simple terms, 
collaboration breeds further collaborations. Other collaborations in this study was 
operationalized as the total number of other collaborative agreements a city has signed 
beside the one under consideration.  
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It was further established in the literature review section that by engaging in 
repeated exchanges jurisdictions are able to develop trust, credibility and commitment in 
their transactions (Andrew, 2009; Coleman, 1988; Frederickson et al., 2004; Wukich, 
2014). Parties involved in a long, close relationship with frequent interactions have 
opportunities to develop understandings and routines that reduce the need for explicit 
planning to coordinate their actions (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Such interpersonal 
relations arising out of exchange relationships help mitigate transaction risks and 
facilitate further interlocal exchange (Olberding, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Schneider 
et al., 2003; Uzzi, 1996). Through this process of exchange embeddedness the behavior 
of collaborating partners becomes more predictable for existing and subsequent 
exchanges (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) creating a basis for increased interlocal cooperation 
(Gerber & Gibson, 2005). In this study, repeated interaction was operationalized as the 
period of time a city has maintained an agreement within a particular service category.  
Ultimately, the longest running agreement was the focal point in each service category. 
 
Control Variables 
The control variables employed in this study are variables that were used as 
predictors of interlocal collaboration in prior studies but ended up producing competing 
results (e.g. Carr et al., 2007; Leroux, 2006; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Post, 2002, 2004; 
Shrestha, 2008). They are fiscal capacity, county density, city population, median 
household income, county seat and form of government.  
Previous research has often hypothesized that the state of a city’s fiscal health can 
influence its decision to either collaborate or not. Where cities are fiscally stressed due to 
low internal revenue mobilization or limited federal and state revenue inflows tended to 
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engage in collaborative arrangements with other local jurisdictions in order to manage 
fiscal hardships (Agranoff & McGuire 2003; Stein, 1990). In this study fiscal capacity 
was operationalized as a city’s own source revenue measured in dollars per capita. 
Federal and state funds were left out of the model for some reasons. First, federal and 
state funds are generally outside the control of cities. Since cities do not necessarily 
control what these funds are used for, this study does not regard them as good proxies for 
examining the internal financial capacity of cities. Additionally, the provision of federal 
and state funds is usually tied to specific statutory mandated collaborative arrangements. 
Since this study is focused solely on voluntary collaborations, federal and state funds 
were left out of the model. The own source revenue variable was transformed into 
revenue per capita by dividing every city’s revenue over its total population. This 
transformation was to done in order to normalize the distribution and avoid biases in the 
model.  
The density of municipalities in a city’s county was also included in the analyses 
to control for regional fragmentation (Andrew & Hawkins, 2012). The study assumes that 
cities that belong to a common county have a shared value system and responsibility 
towards development. Where more cities exist per 100 square miles of a county, there is a 
high likelihood for close collaboration and vice versa. This assumption is supported by 
Post’s (2002) observation of increased local cooperation in higher density regions. In this 
study the density of local governments was determined by dividing the number of 
general-purpose local governments in a County by its land and transforming the result 
into a natural log.  
66 
 
Previous research has established that the size of a city’s population provides a 
general indication of its potential for achieving economies of scale (Joassart-Marcelli & 
Musso, 2005; Nelson, 1997).  City size was operationalized as the total population of the 
city in year 2013. The city size variable was transformed by natural log to normalize its 
distribution. 
A city’s median household income provides a general indication of its residents’ 
effective demand for services. Evidence suggests that both high income and low income 
municipalities engage in interlocal collaboration for a variety of reasons (Morgan & 
Hirlinger, 1991). Because municipalities with lower household incomes tend to lack 
lifestyle services like recreational parks, golf courses, and country clubs they are more 
likely to be motivated for collaboration in order to gain access to lifestyle services. Rich 
communities, on the other hand, may engage in increased cooperation for higher quantity 
or quality of services because of their ability to pay. A natural log of the median 
household income derived from the 2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-year 
estimates was utilized in the analysis. 
County seat status reflects the vertical collaborative capacity of a city. Where a 
city serves as county seat, it is more likely to have a high concentration of county 
administrative offices. The proximity of county officials to city officials may in turn 
increase the likelihood of collaboration. This implies that a city that serves as county seat 
may have less need for collaboration with other cities outside the county. The county seat 
variable was operationalised as a dichotomous variable coded 1 where a city is a county 
seat and 0 where it is not. 
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The form of government characterizes the political and administrative conditions 
of a city. Frederickson’s (1999) administrative conjunctions theory suggests that 
professional administrators are more likely to support interlocal collaboration because of 
their long tenure and shared public service ethics. A council-manager form of 
government is often considered efficiency oriented (Ruhil et al., 1999) and 
entrepreneurial (Teske, Schneider, and Mintrom, 1995) compared to a mayor-council 
government. Interlocal cooperation is expected to be more likely in municipalities with a 
council-manager government than in cities with a mayor-council or commission form of 
government. In this study, form of government was modeled as a dummy variable with 
council-manager form of government serving as reference category.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
Variables in the data were analyzed using both descriptive statistics and binary 
logistic regression models. A number of statistical diagnostics were carried out to ensure 
results of the logistic regression models are more robust. To ensure that predictor 
variables are independent of each other collinearity statistics were sought and examined 
using tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIFs). Any values of the tolerance statistic 
less than 0.1 and any values of the VIF statistic over 10 was regarded as a problematic 
variable. Collinearity in the final model was low; variance inflation factors (VIFs) ranged 
from 1.029 to 2.168 (any value below 10 was deemed acceptable). There were no outliers 
or influential cases in the models. 
Linearity of association between the dependent variables and the interval/ratio 
predictors was examined using scatterplots of studentized residuals and a loess fit line. 
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Curved patterns indicated a non-linear effect of the variable. All scatterplots in the final 
models indicated there were only linear relationships between the independent variables 
and studentized residuals.  
In the initial analyses, the standard error for city manager form of government 
under horizontal collaboration in economic development appeared inflated due to the 
small number of respondents with a city manager form of government. The decision was 
made based on size to combine commission and city manager forms of government into a 
single category under economic development. After doing so, there were no longer any 
inflated standard errors. 
Goodness of fit statistics (Cox and Snell r2, Nagelkerke r2 and p-value) were 
reported for each model. Both full and parsimonious models were sought, with the 
parsimonious model being produced via backwards selection (p > .10 to exit). In order to 
improve the interpretability of the intercept in the models, all interval/ratio and dummy 
independent variables were mean-centered prior to completing the analyses. The model 






Research on collaborative governance has doubtlessly flourished over the past 
three decades. Notwithstanding its increasing popularity there are still certain gaps in 
literature that merit further investigation. Based on the review of existing theoretical and 
empirical literature the study focused attention on two of these research gaps – direction 
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of collaboration and number of collaborating partners. A number of research questions 
have been raised and six (6) hypotheses developed to address these research gaps. 
Consistent with previous studies, the analyses in this research are done using both 
descriptive statistics (for hypothesis 1 – 4) and binary logistic regression (for hypotheses 





























This chapter shows the results of the data analyzed in the study. It begins with a 
brief overview of interlocal governance and interlocal collaboration in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. This is followed by descriptive statistics of the dependent 
variables. The final part of this chapter describes the full and parsimonious models of the 
binary logistic regressions.  
 
Overview of Local Governance in Kentucky 
Kentucky has 418 general purpose local governments (Kentucky League of 
Cities, 2012, p. 4). Prior to the enactment of the Municipal Reclassification Reform Act, 
House Bill 331 (KRS 81.005), Kentucky had six classes of cities. This included one first 
class city, 13 second class cities, 18 third class cities, 117 fourth class cities, 111 fifth 
class cities and 158 sixth class cities. Effective January 1, 2015, pursuant to Kentucky 
House Bill 331,   the arbitrary classification system with six classifications changed to 
two classes – first class and home rule cities.  The city of Louisville remained the only 
first class city by virtue of being a consolidated local government. Lexington became a 
home rule city although it still maintains all responsibilities and privileges under its 
urban-county statutes.   
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Kentucky cities operate under one of four forms of government – mayor 
alderman, mayor council, commission or city manager. Only the Louisville Metro 
government operates under the mayor-alderman form of government due to its first class 
status. Fifty three (53) percent of cities operate under mayor-council, forty two (42) 
percent operate under commission form of government while five (5) percent operate 
under the city manager form (Kentucky League of Cities, 2012, p. 9).  
 
General Overview of Interlocal Agreements in Kentucky 
“If the cities of Kentucky had a slogan, it would probably be ‘doing more with less ...’” 
Sarah Razor, (2011, p. 26) 
 
Interlocal collaboration is a widely recognized mode of service delivery in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. Its application spans from public safety, infrastructure 
development, watershed management to equipment and revenue sharing. Part of the 
reasons for this popularity is the fact that governments at all levels recognize they could 
do “…more with less…” for their citizens through joint efforts (Razor, 2011, p. 26). Most 
importantly, the laws governing local governance in Kentucky provide legitimacy to 
interlocal activities. The Kentucky Interlocal Cooperation Act (KRS 65.210-65.300) is a 
law that has, since its creation in 1962, authorized cities to engage in collaborative 
agreements for the purposes of performing a function or delivering public services. As a 
guide, the Act requires all interlocal agreements to specify the duration of an agreement; 
the composition and powers of participants; how a joint activity will be financed as well 
as the proper procedures for termination and disposal of properties. For an agreement to 
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be legally binding, it must be approved by the Kentucky Department for Local 
Government.  
Between 2000 and 2013, Kentucky recorded a total of 648 interlocal service 
agreements. Out of this figure, 627 were voluntary agreements while the remaining 21 
were agreements that were tied to state grants. Of the 627 voluntary agreements 68 were 
inter-county agreements while the rest (559) were interlocal service agreements that had 
at least one city as a participant. Mutual aid agreements constituted 3.8 percent of the 559 
interlocal service agreements. The remaining 96.2 percent were either pay-for-service or 
joint service agreements. 
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are reported in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2. Out of the 648 interlocal service agreements recorded between years 2000 and 2013 
by the Department of Local Government, 362 agreements representing 55.9 percent were 
included in the survey. The 362 agreements used in this study include collaborative 
agreements between cities selected for the study and cities excluded from the study. The 
286 agreements that were excluded from the study comprises inter-county agreements, 
grant based agreements and agreements signed between any of the 119 cities that were 
left out of the study. According to Table 4.1, of the three service categories examined in 
this study, public safety services rank the highest (41.1 percent) in terms of interlocal 
collaboration. This is followed by economic development (35.4 percent) and 
infrastructure services (23.5 percent) in that order.  
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With respect to the direction of collaboration, Table 4.1 indicates that economic 
development exhibits a greater association (93.8 percent) with vertical collaboration 
whilst public safety exhibits a greater association (18.8 percent) with horizontal 
collaboration. Moreover, in terms of the number of partners in an agreement, 
infrastructure exhibits a greater association (85.9 percent) with bilateral collaboration 




Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
Service category % of N Direction No. of Partners 
 Vertical Horizontal Multilateral Bilateral 
Public Safety 
(149)  




(35.4%) 93.8% 6.2% 14.8% 85.2% 
Infrastructure 
(85) 
(23.5%) 89.4% 10.6% 14.1% 85.9% 
N = 362 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
Consistent with Brown & Potoski (2001, 2003, 2005) and Andrew & Hawkins 
(2012) Table 4.2 examines the dependent variables under four transaction characteristics: 
(1) high asset specificity and difficult to measure, (2) high asset specificity but easy to 
measure (3) low asset specificity and easy to measure (4) low asset specificity but 
difficult to measure. The results displayed in Table 4.2 indicate that of the four 
transaction categories examined in this study, services that are highly asset specific but 
easily measurable rank the highest (41.4 percent) in terms of interlocal collaboration. 
Services that are highly asset specific and at the same time difficult to measure rank 
74 
 
second (40.1 percent) followed by services that have low asset specificity but are difficult 
to measure (11.1 percent) and services that have low asset specificity but are easy to 
measure (7.4 percent) in that order.  
 
Table 4.2  
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables based on Transaction Characteristics 
Service Category Direction No. of Partners 
 Vertical Horizontal Multilateral Bilateral
high asset specificity and difficult to measure 
















Police Protection/ Law Enforcement  
Emergency Disaster Planning  
Planning and Zoning Building 
Inspection &Code Enforcement  
Enterprise Zone & Industrial 
Development  
 
high asset specificity but easy to measure 












Tax Collection & revenue sharing  
Housing & energy  
Cable & internet  




low asset specificity and easy to measure 







 10% Equipment Sharing 
Information sharing/ Human Resources 
Sharing  
 
low asset specificity but difficult to measure 
Emergency Medical Response (EMS)   5.2%  2.2% 0.9% 6.5% 
Parks and Recreation/ Tourism  
N = 362 87.6% 13.4% 19.9% 80.1% 




With respect to the direction of collaboration, table 4.2 shows that services that 
are highly asset specific but easy to measure exhibit a greater association (38.4 percent) 
with vertical collaborations while services that are highly asset specific but difficult to 
measure exhibit a greater association (6.1 percent) towards horizontal collaborations. 
Additionally, with respect to the number of collaborating partners, services that are 
highly asset specific but easy to measure exhibit a greater association (32.6 percent) with 
bilateral collaborations while services that are highly asset specific but difficult to 
measure (11 percent) exhibit a greater association with multilateral collaborations. 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Predictor and Control Variables 
Descriptive statistics on the predictor and control variables are reported in Table 
4.3. On the average a municipality has collaborated repeatedly for 7.5 years on 2.5 
services. Additionally the results indicate that the average municipality generates $93.27 
as revenue from sources other than the county or state. This revenue figure was unusually 
low because of missing data on revenue. The uniform financial report provided by the 
Kentucky League of Cities did not provide revenue information for all the cities included 
in the study. 
Table 4.3 indicates that on the average 1.9 cities exist per 100 square miles of a 
county. The average number of people in a city is 4,502 whilst the median municipal 
household income is $37,118.70. Amongst the 299 cities included in the study, 37.8 
percent serve as county seats. With respect to form of government, 29.4 percent of cities 
operate a commission form of government, 64.2 percent operate a mayor-council form of 
government while 6.4 percent operate a city manager form of government. 
76 
 
Table 4.3  
Descriptive Statistics for Predictor Variables 
Variable Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
  
Predictors  
Collaboration in other services 0 26 2.50 3.52 
Repeated interaction 0 14 6.89 5.30 
  
Controls  
Fiscal Capacity 0 6,804 93.27 497.94 
Municipal Density 0.2 9.82 0.02 0.02 
City population 232 61,488 4,501.81 7,980.67 
Median household income 11,813 106,250 37,118.70 15,046.44 
County seat  0 1 0.38 0.49 
Form of government 0 2 0.77 0.55 
N = 299  
1 Reference group  
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
 
Regression Models on the Direction of Collaboration 
Tables 4.4 to 4.9 display the results of the final regression models that examine 
the direction of collaboration in public safety, economic development and infrastructure. 




As shown in Table 4.4, four variables (collaboration in other services, repeated 
interaction, county density and median income) out of the eight predictor variables are 
significant predictors of the likelihood of vertical collaboration in public safety. The 
parsimonious model explained approximately 35 percent of the unexplained variance of 




Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Vertical Collaboration in 
Public Safety1 
Variables Full model Parsimonious model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 1.709*** 0.112 1.724*** 0.105 
Repeated interaction 1.122** 0.042 1.127** 0.041 
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 1.000 0.000   
County Density 0.535*** 0.137 0.525*** 0.130 
City population (ln) 0.975 0.189   
Median income (ln) 0.392 0.620 0.321* 0.559 
County seat 1.226 0.424   
Form of Government 
(Commission = reference group)
 
   
            Mayor Council  1.378 0.462   
            City Manager 1.378 0.867   
Constant 0.210*** 0.210  0.212*** 0.208 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.35 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.511 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.354 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.504 for the 
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of vertical collaboration for the average municipality 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit) 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
Table 4.4, shows that each one-unit increase in the number of other service 
collaborations is associated with a 72.4 percent increase in the likelihood vertical 
collaboration in public safety. Additionally, each one-year increase in the duration of 
collaboration is associated with a 12.7 percent increase in the likelihood vertical 
collaboration in public safety. However, each one-unit increase in the number of cities 
per 100 square miles is associated with a 47.5 percent decrease in the likelihood of 
vertical collaboration in public safety. Again, each dollar increase in median income is 





The results of regression models predicting the likelihood of horizontal 
collaboration in public safety are displayed in Table 4.5. Five variables (collaboration in 
other services, repeated interaction, median income, county seat and mayor council) out 
of the eight predictor variables employed in the model are significant. The parsimonious 
model explained approximately 30 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent 




Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Horizontal 
Collaboration in Public Safety1 
Variables Full model Parsimonious model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 1.356** 0.091 1.387*** 0.080 
Repeated interaction 1.170** 0.076 1.176** 0.077 
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 0.999 0.002   
County Density 1.111 0.091   
City population (ln) 0.825 0.274   
Median income (ln) 5.617** 0.871 7.433** 0.751 
County seat 0.454 0.684 0.293** 0.595 
Form of Government 
(Commission = reference group)
 
   
            Mayor Council  2.919 0.760 2.933* 0.569 
            City Manager 0.681 1.571   
Constant 0.033*** 0.467 0.031*** 0.465 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.301 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.579 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.296 and Nagelkerke R2 =0 .568 for the 
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of horizontal collaboration for the average municipality; 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit) 




From Table 4.5, it is clear that each one-unit increase in the number of other 
service collaborations is associated with a 38.7 percent increase in the likelihood 
horizontal collaboration in public safety. Similarly, each one-year increase in the duration 
of collaboration is associated with a 17.6 percent increase in the likelihood horizontal 
collaboration in public safety. Again, each dollar increase in median income is associated 
with a 643.3 percent increase in the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in public 
safety. Also having a mayor-council form of government is associated with a county seat 
is associated with a 193.3 percent increase in the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in 
public safety. However, being a county seat is however associated with a 70.7 percent 




Table 4.6 provides results of regression models predicting the likelihood of 
vertical collaboration in economic development. Four variables (collaboration in other 
services, repeated interaction, county seat and city manager) out of the eight predictor 
variables employed in the model are significant. The parsimonious model explained 
approximately 21 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox 








Table 4.6  
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Vertical Collaboration in 
Economic Development1 
Variables Full model Parsimonious model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 1.088 0.061 1.126** 0.056 
Repeated interaction 1.147** 0.046 1.153** 0.045 
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 0.999 0.001   
County Density 1.044 0.082   
City population (ln) 1.065 0.197   
Median income (ln) 1.027 0.674   
County seat 3.691** 0.480 3.087** 0.372 
Form of Government 
(Commission = reference group)
    
            Mayor Council  1.004 0.542   
            City Manager 4.292* 0.851 4.762** 0.591 
Constant 0.102*** 0.267 0.108*** 0.251 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.217 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.365 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.209 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.352 for the 
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of vertical collaboration for the average municipality 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >.10 to exit) 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
Table 4.6, shows that each one-unit increase in the number of other service 
collaborations is associated with a 12.6 percent increase in the likelihood of vertical 
collaboration in economic development. Each one-year increase in the duration of 
collaboration is associated with a 15.3 percent increase in the likelihood horizontal 
collaboration in economic development. Being the seat of county government and having 
a city manager form of government are associated with 208.7 percent and 376.2 percent 





Table 4.7 provides results of regression models predicting the likelihood of 
horizontal collaboration in economic development. Only the collaboration in other 
services and city population variables were significant in this model. The parsimonious 
model explained approximately 7 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent 
variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 =0.074; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.216). 
 
Table 4.7 
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Horizontal 
Collaboration in Economic Development1 
Variables Full model Parsimonious model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 1.152** 0.065 1.171** 0.057 
Repeated interaction 0.992 0.149   
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 1.000 0.001   
County Density 1.180 0.105   
City population (ln) 1.710* 0.412 1.670* 0.232 
Median income (ln) 0.414 1.517   
County seat 1.340 0.746   
Form of Government3 
(Commission/city manager = 
reference group) 
    
            Mayor Council  1.194 0.642   
Constant 0.029*** 0.414 0.033*** 0.368 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.082 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.241 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.074 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.216 for the 
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of horizontal for the average municipality 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit) 
3In the regressions commission and city manager forms of government were combined as 
one variable in order to reduce the initial inflated standard errors. 




Table 4.7 shows that collaboration in other services is associated with a 17.1 
percent increase in the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in economic development. 
Again, each one unit increase in the number of people in a city is associated with a 67 




Table 4.8 provides results of regression models predicting the likelihood of 
vertical collaboration in infrastructure. One variable (repeated interaction) out of the 
eight predictor variables is significant. The parsimonious model explained approximately 
23 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 



























Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Vertical Collaboration in 
Infrastructure1 
Variables Full model Parsimonious model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 1.095 0.057   
Repeated interaction 1.269*** 0.040 1.264*** 0.034 
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 0.999 0.001   
County Density 0.943 0.072   
City population (ln) 0.814 0.168   
Median income (ln) 0.801 0.517   
County seat 1.281 0.393   
Form of Government 
(Commission = reference group)
    
            Mayor Council  0.776 0.408   
            City Manager 0.462 0.777   
Constant 0.224*** 0.207 0.231*** 0.200 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.252 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.365 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.234 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.339 for the 
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of vertical collaboration for the average municipality 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit) 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
From Table 4.8, it can be observed that each one-year increase in the duration of 
collaboration is associated with a 26.4 percent increase in the likelihood of vertical 
collaboration in infrastructure.  
 
Horizontal Collaboration 
The final regression model predicting the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in 
infrastructure is shown in Table 4.9. Three variables (repeated interaction, county density 
and median income) out of the eight predictor variables employed in the model are 
significant. The parsimonious model explained approximately 12 percent of the 
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unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 =0.115; 
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.407). 
 
Table 4.9 
 Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Horizontal 
Collaboration in Infrastructure1 
Variables Full model Parsimonious model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 1.006 0.089   
Repeated interaction 1.652** 0.184 1.522** 0.153 
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 1.000 0.001   
County Density 1.381** 0.121 1.394** 0.106 
City population (ln) 0.533* 0.372   
Median income (ln) 0.073** 1.234 0.064** 1.051 
County seat 0.633 0.846   
Form of Government 
(Commission = reference group)
    
            Mayor Council  3.849 1.027   
            City Manager 45.303** 1.666   
Constant 0.003*** 1.218 0.006*** 1.038 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.134 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.407 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.115 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.349 for the 
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of horizontal for the average municipality 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit) 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
Reference to Table 4.9 each one-year increase in the duration of collaboration is 
associated with a 52.2 percent increase in the likelihood horizontal collaboration in 
infrastructure. Each one-unit increase in the number of cities per 100 square miles is 
associated with a 39.4 percent increase in the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in 
infrastructure. However, each dollar increase in median income is associated with a 93.6 
percent decrease in the likelihood of vertical collaboration in infrastructure. 
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Regressions Models on the Number of Collaborators  
Tables 4.10 to 4.15 show the results of the regression models examining the 




As shown in Table 4.10, of the eight predictor variables employed in the model 
only collaboration in other services and repeated interaction significantly predict the 
likelihood of bilateral collaboration in public safety. The parsimonious model for public 
safety explained approximately 25 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent 
















Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Bilateral Collaboration 
in Public Safety 
Variables Full model Parsimonious model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 1.322*** 0.080 1.279*** 0.063 
Repeated interaction 1.175** 0.051 1.192*** 0.050 
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 1.000 0.000   
County Density 0.937 0.082   
City population (ln) 0.952 0.191   
Median income (ln) 2.341 0.632   
County seat 1.602 0.469   
Form of Government 
(Commission = reference group)
 
   
            Mayor Council  1.063 0.499   
            City Manager 0.807 0.865   
Constant 0.116*** 0.271 0.119*** 0.268 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.263 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.420 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.253 and Nagelkerke R2 =0 .405 for the 
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of bilateral collaboration for the average municipality 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit) 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
Table 4.10 also indicates that each one-unit increase in the number of other 
service collaborations is associated with a 27.9 percent increase in the likelihood of 
bilateral collaboration in public safety. Similarly, each one-year increase in the duration 
of collaboration is associated with a 19.2 percent increase in the likelihood of bilateral 
collaboration in public safety. 
 
Multilateral Collaboration 
Results of the binary logistic models predicting the likelihood of multilateral 
collaboration in public safety are shown in Table 4.11. In addition to collaboration in 
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other services and repeated interaction, a city’s median household income and form of 
government also serve as significant predictors of the likelihood of multilateral 
collaboration in public safety. The parsimonious model explained approximately 30 
percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 
=0.301; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.450). 
 
Table 4.11 
 Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Multilateral 
Collaboration in Public Safety1 
Variables Full model Parsimonious model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 1.550*** 0.094 1.520*** 0.078 
Repeated interaction 1.090** 0.043 1.096** 0.041 
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 1.000 0.000   
County Density 0.930 0.088   
City population (ln) 1.092 0.186   
Median income (ln) 0.278** 0.626 0.238** 0.508 
County seat 0.980 0.422   
Form of Government 
(Commission = reference group)
 
   
            Mayor Council  2.632* 0.512 2.550* 0.401 
            City Manager 1.011 0.884   
Constant 0.189*** 0.220 0.192*** 0.215 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.304 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.455 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.301 and Nagelkerke R2 =0 .450 for the 
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of multilateral collaboration for the average municipality 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit) 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
From Table 4.11 each one-unit increase in the number of other service 
collaborations is associated with a 52 percent increase in the likelihood of multilateral 
collaboration in public safety. Similarly, each one-year increase in the duration of 
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collaboration is associated with a 9.6 percent increase in the likelihood multilateral 
collaboration in public safety. Also, operating as a mayor-council instead of a 
commission form of government is associated with a 155 percent increase in the 
likelihood of multilateral collaboration in public safety. However, each dollar increase in 
median income is associated with a 76.2 percent decrease in the likelihood of multilateral 




Table 4.12 shows regression models for the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in 
economic development. Out of the eight predictor variables used in the model four 
(collaboration in other services, repeated interaction, county seat and city manager) 
significantly predict the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in economic development. 
The parsimonious model explained approximately 25 percent of the unexplained variance 













Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Bilateral Collaboration 
in Economic Development 1 
Variables Full model Parsimonious Model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 1.162** 0.067 1.201** 0.060 
Repeated interaction 1.143** 0.042 1.138** 0.042 
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 0.999 0.001   
County Density 1.056 0.080   
City population (ln) 0.874 0.189   
Median income (ln) 1.757 0.627   
County seat 5.008** 0.464 3.417** 0.354 
Form of Government 
(Commission = reference group)
 
   
            Mayor Council  1.202 0.505   
            City Manager 4.227* 0.838 3.037* 0.560 
Constant 0.134***  0.243  0.091*** 0.228 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.255 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.401 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.246 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.386 for the 
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of bilateral collaboration for the average municipality 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >.10 to exit) 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
  From Table 4.12, it can be observed that collaboration in other services is 
associated with a 20.1 percent increase in the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in 
economic development. Additionally, each one-year increase in the duration of 
collaboration is associated with a 13.8 percent increase in the likelihood of bilateral 
collaboration in economic development. Again, being a county seat is associated with a 
241.7 percent increase in the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in economic 
development. Additionally, being a city manager is associated with a 203.7 percent 




The results of logistic regressions predicting the likelihood of multilateral 
collaboration in economic development are shown in Table 4.13. In all, four variables 
(collaboration in other services, repeated interaction, county density and county seat) out 
of the eight predictor variables are significant. The parsimonious model explained 
approximately 31 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox 
and Snell R2 =0.308; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.498). 
 
Table 4.13 
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Multilateral 
Collaboration in Economic Development1 
Variables Full model Parsimonious model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 1.245** 0.077 1.271** 0.076 
Repeated interaction 1.101** 0.046 1.100** 0.045 
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 1.000 0.000   
County Density 1.419*** 0.099 1.373*** 0.086 
City population (ln) 1.127 0.214   
Median income (ln) 0.660 0.682   
County seat 0.267** 0.528 0.371** 0.457 
Form of Government 
(Commission = reference group) 
 
   
            Mayor Council  1.420 0.534   
            City Manager 1.829 0.975   
Constant 0.132*** 0.239 0.135*** 0.234 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.313 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.506 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.308 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.498 for the 
parsimonious model, all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of multilateral collaboration for the average municipality 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit) 




Reference to table 4.13, each one-unit increase in the number of other service 
collaborations is associated with a 27.1 percent increase in the likelihood of multilateral 
collaboration in economic development. Additionally, each one-year increase in the 
duration of collaboration is associated with a 10 percent increase in the likelihood 
multilateral collaboration in economic development. Moreover, each one-unit increase in 
the number of cities per square mile is associated with a 37.3 percent increase in the 
likelihood of multilateral collaboration in economic development. However, being a 
county seat is associated with a 62.9 percent decrease in the likelihood of multilateral 




Table 4.14 below provides results of regressions models predicting the likelihood 
of bilateral collaboration in infrastructure. Three (repeated interaction, county density 
and city population) out of the eight predictor variables used in the model are significant. 
The parsimonious model explained approximately 16 percent of the unexplained variance 











Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Bilateral Collaboration 
in Infrastructure1 
Variables Full model Parsimonious model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 0.974 0.061   
Repeated interaction 1.261*** 0.042 1.255*** 0.040 
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 1.000 0.000   
County Density 0.758 0.116 0.763** 0.098 
City population (ln) 0.557** 0.196 0.648** 0.142 
Median income (ln) 1.767 0.578   
County seat 1.729* 0.444   
Form of Government 
(Commission = reference group)
    
            Mayor Council  1.011 0.445   
            City Manager 1.813 0.863   
Constant 0.121*** 0.232 0.125*** 0.228 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.166 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.277 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.155 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.259 for the 
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of bilateral collaboration for the average municipality 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >.10 to exit) 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
 
From Table 4.14, each one-year increase in the duration of collaboration is 
associated with a 25.5 percent increase in the likelihood bilateral collaboration in 
infrastructure. However, each one-unit increase in the number of cities per 100 square 
miles is associated with a 23.7 percent decrease in the likelihood bilateral collaboration in 
infrastructure.  Also, each one-unit increase in the number of people in a city is 






Table 4.15 provides results of regressions models predicting the likelihood of 
multilateral collaboration in infrastructure. Only two variables (collaboration in other 
services and repeated interaction) out of the eight predictor variables employed in the 
model are significant. The parsimonious model explained approximately 19 percent of 
the unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 =0.19.1; 
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.30). 
Table 4.15 
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Multilateral 
Collaboration in Infrastructure1 
Variables Full model Parsimonious model2 
Odds ratios S.E Odds ratios S.E 
Collaboration in other services 1.105* 0.056 1.127** 0.051 
Repeated interaction 1.253*** 0.054 1.236*** 0.053 
Fiscal Capacity (per capita) 1.000 0.001   
County Density 1.139* 0.075   
City population (ln) 0.984 0.195   
Median income (ln) 0.393 0.639   
County seat 0.840 0.467   
Form of Government 
(Commission = reference group)
    
            Mayor Council  0.633 0.483   
            City Manager 0.895 0.854   
Constant 0.092*** 0.295 0.097*** 0.289 
1 Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.207 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.348 
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.191 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.320 for the 
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be 
interpreted as the odds of multilateral collaboration for the average municipality 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
2 Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit) 
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016 
 
From Table 4.15, each one-unit increase in the number of other service 
collaborations is associated with a 12.7 percent increase in the likelihood multilateral 
94 
 
collaboration in infrastructure. Additionally, each one-year increase in the duration of 
collaboration is associated with a 23.6 percent increase in the likelihood multilateral 














































DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
	
Introduction 
A general discussion of results and major findings from the data analyzed in 
chapter IV are presented in this chapter. Through the lens of existing theoretical and 
empirical literature, the chapter also tests the hypotheses introduced in chapter III.  
 
Characteristics of Services and the Pattern of Collaboration 
In the previous chapter, four dependent variables measuring the direction 
(horizontal / vertical) and number of partners (bilateral / multilateral) in a collaborative 
agreement were examined using data on interlocal service agreements from the Kentucky 
Department of Local Government. The dependent variables were examined for three 
service categories: (1) public safety (2) economic development and (3) infrastructure 
development. Consistent with Brown & Potoski (2001, 2003, 2005) and Andrew & 
Hawkins (2012) these three service categories were further examined under four 
transaction characteristics: (1) low asset specificity and low service measurability, (2) 
high asset specificity and high service measurability, (3) low asset specificity but high 
service measurability, and (4) high asset specificity but low service measurability. 
Hypotheses 1- 4 were tested based on these four transaction characteristics.  
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Descriptive statistics in chapter IV indicated that compared to economic 
development (35.4 percent) and infrastructure services (23.5 percent), public safety 
services rank highest (41.1 percent) in terms of number of registered interlocal 
agreements. The finding on public safety goes contrary to Post’s (2004) assertion that 
public safety functions attract less inter-local collaboration because they are mainly labor 
intensive. It is however consistent with Carr et al. (2007) and Leroux’s (2006) empirical 
findings on interlocal collaboration in Detroit. Given the fact that public safety remains 
the largest systems maintenance function on municipal budgets, this finding is 
unsurprising.  
Descriptive statistics on the direction of collaboration indicated that compared to 
other public services, economic development services have a greater association (93.8 
percent) with vertical collaboration whilst public safety services have a greater 
association (18.8percent) with horizontal collaboration. In terms of the number of 
partners in an agreement, infrastructure (85.9 percent) has the greatest association with 
bilateral collaboration whilst public safety has the greatest association (27.5 percent) with 
multilateral collaboration.  
Prior research based on transaction cost theory suggests that transaction 
characteristics such as asset specificity and service measurability play important roles in 
local governments’ decisions to collaborate (e.g. Andrew, 2009; Andrew & Hawkins, 
2012; Brown & Potoski, 2001 2003, 2005; Carr et al., 2009; Feiock & Scholz, 2010; 
Hawkins, 2009). From the analyses it became clear that compared to other transaction 
characteristics, services that are highly asset specific but easily measurable (911 radio 
communications, tax collection & revenue sharing, housing & energy, cable & internet, 
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sewer system, telecommunications, water)  attract the highest percentage of interlocal 
agreements (41.4 percent). Services that are highly asset specific but difficult to measure 
(fire protection & response, police protection/ law enforcement, emergency disaster 
planning, planning and zoning, building inspection &code enforcement, enterprise zone 
& industrial development) rank second (40.1 percent) followed by services that have low 
asset specificity but are difficult to measure (11.1 percent) and services that have low 
asset specificity but are easy to measure (7.4 percent). These findings support previous 
research that all things considered, the specificity of an investment is a major determinant 
of interlocal collaboration. 
With respect to the direction of collaboration, the analyses indicated that 
compared to other transaction characteristics services that are highly asset specific but 
easy to measure exhibit a greater association (38.4 percent) with vertical collaboration. 
On the other hand services that are highly asset specific but difficult to measure have a 
greater association (6.1 percent) with horizontal collaboration. These findings are 
inconsistent with hypotheses 1 and 2 that:  (1) cities are more likely to collaborate 
vertically on services that have high levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty 
and (2) cities are more likely to collaborate horizontally on services that have lower 
levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty. 
In terms of the number of partners in an agreement, the analyses indicated that 
compared to other transaction characteristics services that are highly asset specific but 
easy to measure exhibit a greater association (32.8 percent) with bilateral collaboration. 
Services that are highly asset specific but difficult to measure have a greater association 
(11 percent) with multilateral collaboration. These findings do not support research 
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hypotheses 3 that: (3) cities are more likely to collaborate bilaterally on services that 
have lower levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty.  They are however 
consistent with hypothesis 4 that: (4) cities are more likely to collaborate multilaterally 
on services that have higher levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty.  
 
Network Embeddedness and the Pattern of Collaboration 
Simon (1945) noted that the “administrative man” unlike the “economic man”, 
has fragmentary knowledge about the consequences of economic transactions. Limited 
information thus leaves municipalities prone to opportunistic behavior from partners. To 
offset this, jurisdictions may rely on relational mechanisms to facilitate exchange 
(Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Previous studies have 
suggested that by engaging in repeated exchanges jurisdictions are able to develop trust, 
credibility and commitment that help mitigate transaction risks and facilitate further 
interlocal exchange (Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2005). Others have suggested that a city’s 
collaboration in one set of service agreements can reinforce collaborations in other sets of 
agreements (Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2005).  
In this study, collaborations in other services and repeated interaction were 
included in the model to explain how network embededdness influences the direction and 
number of partners in a collaborative agreement. The results of the analyses reveal that 
with respect to direction, collaborations in other services and repeated interaction best 
predict the likelihood of vertical collaboration in public safety, explaining 35 percent of 
the unexplained variance. This is followed by horizontal collaboration in public safety 
(30 percent), vertical collaboration in economic development (27 percent), vertical 
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collaboration in infrastructure (23 percent), horizontal collaboration in infrastructure (17 
percent) and horizontal collaboration in economic development (7 percent).  
In terms of number of partners, collaborations in other services and repeated 
interaction best predict the likelihood of multilateral collaboration in economic 
development, explaining 31 percent of the unexplained variance. This is followed by 
multilateral collaboration in public safety (30 percent), bilateral collaboration in public 
safety (25 percent), multilateral collaboration in infrastructure (19 percent), bilateral 
collaboration in economic development (25 percent) and bilateral collaboration in 
infrastructure (16 percent) in that order.  
 
Collaboration in other services and the Pattern of Collaboration 
Out of twelve (12) regression models, the collaboration in other services variable 
was significant in nine (9). The variable was not significant in predicting the likelihood of 
vertical collaboration in infrastructure, horizontal collaborations in infrastructure and 
bilateral collaboration in infrastructure. The highest percentage increase in the likelihood 
of collaboration was recorded for multilateral collaboration in public safety (52 percent 
increase) while the lowest percentage increase in the likelihood of collaboration was 
recorded for multilateral collaboration in economic development (12.5 percent increase). 
The relation between the collaboration in other services variable and the likelihood of 
collaboration was positive in all nine (9) models. 
By significantly predicting nine out of twelve models, one is justified to concur 
with Leroux (2006) and Shrestha (2005) that a city’s collaboration in one set of 
agreements reinforces collaborations in other sets of agreements. The research hypothesis 
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that collaboration in other service areas has a positive effect on the likelihood of 
collaborating on the service in question is therefore supported. 
 
Repeated Interaction and the Pattern of Collaboration 
  The results of the analyses indicate that repeated interaction is a significant 
predictor of the likelihood of collaboration in eleven (11) out of twelve regression 
models. The variable was not significant in predicting the likelihood of horizontal 
collaboration in economic development. Coefficients in all eleven (11) models show 
positive relations between the repeated interaction variable and the likelihood of 
collaboration. The highest percentage increase in the likelihood of collaboration was 
recorded for horizontal collaboration in infrastructure (52.2 percent increase) while the 
lowest percentage increase in the likelihood of collaboration was recorded for multilateral 
collaboration in public safety (9.6 percent increase). Given the fact that infrastructure is 
an asset specific service with high start-up costs, it is not surprising that it takes a large 
amount of trust and credibility developed through repeated interaction to influence 
horizontal collaboration on this particular service.  
Two factors help explain the low percentage increase recorded for multilateral 
collaboration on public safety. In this study almost all the multilateral public safety 
agreements recorded had at least one county partner. Since counties hold administrative 
and regulatory rights, their involvement in an agreement reduces potential any risks of 
opportunistic behaviors. Trust and credibility developed through repeated interactions 
will therefore have limited influence in such circumstances. 
Notwithstanding these observations the study concurs with the findings of Leroux 
(2006) and Shrestha (2005) that where municipalities repeatedly interact they develop 
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trust and social capital necessary for forging further cooperative endeavors. The research 
hypothesis that repeated interaction in the past between transacting jurisdictions 
increases the likelihood of collaboration is thus supported by the above findings. 
 
Fiscal Capacity and the Pattern of Collaboration 
Previous studies have often suggested that fiscal stress due to low internal revenue 
mobilization or limited federal and state revenue inflows encourage interlocal 
collaboration (e.g. Adhikari, 2015; Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 
1985; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Bartle & Swayze, 1997; Krueger & McGuire, 2005; 
MacManus & Caruson, 2008; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Sonenblum et al., 1977; Stein, 
1990; Wood, 2004). In this study fiscal capacity was a significant predictor in one model 
– the likelihood of vertical collaboration in infrastructure. The relation between fiscal 
capacity and vertical collaboration was negative indicating that each dollar increase in a 
city’s own revenue per capita was associated with 0.1 percent decrease in the likelihood 
of vertical collaboration in infrastructure. Given the fact that infrastructure is an asset 
specific service with high start-up cost, it stands to reason that cities may collaborate with 
counties only when their capacity to fund these services themselves is low. It is therefore 
not surprising that the likelihood of collaborating with counties decrease as cities’ 
internally generated revenues increase.  
Since fiscal capacity was a significant predictor in only one (1) out of twelve (12) 
models, one may concur with previous findings by Carr et al., (2007); Leroux, (2006); 
Shrestha, (2005); Thurmaier, (2005); Thurmaier and Wood (2002) that a local 
government’s fiscal capacity does little to predict interlocal collaboration.  
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County Density and the Pattern of Collaboration 
According to Axelrod (1984) when jurisdictions are in close proximity they tend 
to interact more. This research assumes that cities located within a common county have 
a shared value system and responsibility towards the development of their jurisdictions. 
Where more cities exist per 100 square miles of county, there is a high likelihood for 
close collaboration and vice versa.  
In this study the local government density variable was significant in predicting 
the likelihood of collaboration in four (4) regression models – vertical collaboration in 
public safety, multilateral collaboration in economic development, bilateral collaboration 
in infrastructure and horizontal collaboration in infrastructure. The highest percentage 
increase in the likelihood of collaboration was recorded for horizontal collaboration in 
infrastructure (39.4 percent increase). The relation between the local government density 
variable and the likelihood of collaboration was negative in two (2) models – vertical 
collaboration in public safety (47.5 percent decrease) and bilateral collaboration in 
infrastructure (23.7 decrease). 
Infrastructure services usually have high start-up costs. For efficiency gains, 
municipalities in high density areas are better off developing infrastructure services 
together and sharing these start-up costs. It is not surprising that as the number of cities 
per 100 square miles increases, the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in infrastructure 
increases. This finding is consistent with the observations of Axelrod (1984), Post (2002), 
Leroux (2006), Shrestha (2005) and Adhikari (2015) that density of municipalities has a 
positive influence on the likelihood of interlocal cooperation.  
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Aside having high start-up costs, infrastructure services are also highly asset 
specific and therefore more prone to opportunism. To avoid opportunistic behavior 
municipalities in high density areas may prefer to have less bilateral collaborations on 
infrastructure services. This explains why as the number of cities per 100 square miles 
increases, the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in infrastructure decreases. Public 
safety services on the other hand have spillover effects (positive externalities). It is easy 
for a neighboring jurisdiction B to benefit from jurisdiction A’s law enforcement services 
without participating in any agreements. Where several municipalities exist per 100 
square miles, the motivation to collaborate with a county on public safety may be low 
since municipalities have increased incentive to free-ride and enjoy public safety services 
from their neighbors. The finding that as the density of local governments increases the 
likelihood of vertical collaboration in public safety decreases is therefore not surprising. 
 
City Population and the Pattern of Collaboration 
Some prior studies, a city’s population indicates its potential for achieving 
economies of scale (cf. Adhikari, 2015; Joassart-Marcelli & Musso, 2005; LeRoux et al., 
2010; Nelson, 1997).  Thus population size is regarded as a good predictor of interlocal 
collaboration.  Two opposing views exist regarding the direction of the population size 
hypothesis. There are those that hypothesize that smaller jurisdictions are more likely to 
support interlocal collaboration because operating independently they may not be able to 
provide public services in a cost efficient manner. By pooling resources together small 
cities can improve the efficiency of service delivery (Andrew, 2008a; Mohr et al., 2010). 
Conversely, others hypothesize that larger jurisdiction are more likely to collaborate 
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because they tend to have lower cost of obtaining information, negotiating agreements 
and enforcing agreements (Kwon & Feiock, 2010). Caruson and MacManus (2006a) have 
observed for instance that in emergency management preparedness that because larger 
jurisdictions are prone to more vulnerabilities, they tend to have extensive emergency 
preparedness networks.  
In this study population size was a significant predictor in two out of twelve 
regression models – the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in economic development 
and the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in infrastructure. The relation between 
population size and the likelihood of horizontal collaboration was positive. However, the 
relation between population size and the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in 
infrastructure was negative. Each one-unit increase in the size of a city’s population was 
associated with a 35.2 percent decrease in the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in 
infrastructure. As explained earlier, because infrastructure services are capital intensive 
and asset specific they are more prone to opportunism. Rational and self interested cities 
may prefer to look for alternatives that are less likely to attract opportunistic behavior as 
population increases and demand for infrastructure surges.  Additionally, cities with large 
populations are more likely to have large tax resources to fund infrastructure investment 
and may not need to collaborate. These explain why as population increases the 
likelihood of bilateral collaboration in infrastructure decreases. 
 
Median Household Income and the Direction of Collaboration 
A city’s median household income is a general proxy for its aggregate effective 
demand for services (Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2005). It may also be considered as an 
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indicator of a city’s fiscal capacity (Adhikari, 2015). Similar to the population size 
hypothesis, there are conflicting views as to the direction of the median income 
hypothesis. There are those that hypothesize that cities with lower median incomes are 
more likely to support interlocal collaboration because it enables them to take advantage 
of the financial resources available to other cities (c.f Leroux and Carr, 2007). Adhikari 
(2015) surmises that residents of cities with lower median household incomes rely 
heavily on public infrastructure and other social-benefit programs. It stands to reason 
therefore that the likelihood of lower median income cities collaborating with other local 
governments will be high.  
Yet still, there are others who suggest the direction of the median income 
hypothesis is curvilinear. Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) posit that both poor and rich 
communities enter into interlocal agreements based on different financial motivations. 
Communities with low median incomes collaborate in order to cut down administrative 
and production costs while rich communities collaborate because they can enjoy more 
services at an affordable price.   
In this study median household income was a significant predictor of the 
likelihood of collaboration in four (4) models – multilateral collaboration in public safety, 
vertical collaboration in public safety, horizontal collaboration in public safety and 
horizontal collaboration in infrastructure. The relation between the median household 
income variable and the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in public safety was 
positive (643.3 percent increase) and consistent with the observations of Morgan and 
Hirlinger (1991). However, each dollar increase in median income was associated with a 
76.2 percent decrease in the likelihood of multilateral collaboration in public safety. Also, 
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each dollar increase in median income was associated with a 67.9 percent decrease in the 
likelihood of vertical collaboration in public safety. 
Having a high median income means a city can afford to provide better quality 
public safety services to its citizens and may be more inclined to produce them. It also 
means a city can maintain exclusivity by avoiding too many partners in a public safety 
agreement. Additionally, it means high income cities can take more risks by collaborating 
less with the county and more with other cities on specialized public safety services.  
In the case of infrastructure services, the results indicated that each dollar increase 
in median income is associated with a 93.6 percent decrease in the likelihood of 
horizontal collaboration in infrastructure. Given the fact that infrastructure services are 
capital intensive and asset specific even when median incomes increase cities may still 
prefer to look for other modes of service delivery that are less prone to opportunism. 
 
County Seat and the Direction of Collaboration 
A county seat status suggests that a city’s administrative branch has close 
proximity to the corridors of power. Where a city serves as county seat, it is more likely 
to have a high concentration of county administrative offices. The proximity of county 
officials to city officials would invariably increase the likelihood of collaboration.  
In this study the county seat variable was a significant predictor of the likelihood 
of collaboration in four (4) regression models – horizontal collaboration in public safety, 
vertical collaboration in economic development, bilateral collaboration in economic 
development and multilateral collaboration in economic development. The relation 
between county seat and the likelihood of vertical collaboration in economic 
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development was positive (208.7 percent increase).  Similarly, the relation between the 
county seat variable and the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in economic 
development was positive (241.7 percent increase). However, being a county seat was 
associated with a 62.9 percent decrease in the likelihood of collaborating multilaterally in 
economic development and a 70.7 percent decrease in the likelihood of collaborating 
horizontally in public safety.  
By virtue of being administrative seats, cities that serve as county capitals have 
significant access to economic development services. This implies that any interlocal 
collaboration on economic development services may be limited to a few partners instead 
of multiple collaborating partners. Similarly, proximity to the corridors of power means 
cities that serve as county seats have ready access to county law enforcement services and 
other public safety services. The likelihood of these cities participating in interlocal 
collaboration with other cities in the county on public safety services is sure to decrease.  
 
Form of Government and the Direction of Collaboration 
The form of government characterizes the political and institutional conditions of 
a city. According to the administrative conjunction theory the longer tenure and 
commonly shared public service ethic among professional administrators makes them 
more development oriented compared to elected officials (Frederickson, 1999). Prior 
studies have therefore hypothesized based on the theory of administrative conjunctions 
that cities in a council-manager form of government are more likely to participate in 
interlocal cooperation than cities with a mayor-council government (Brown & Potoski, 
2003; Ruhil et al., 1999; Schneider et al., 1995) 
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In this study, form of government was significant in three regression models – 
bilateral collaboration in economic development, horizontal collaboration in public safety 
and vertical collaboration in economic development.  The relation between the form of 
government variable and the likelihood of collaboration in all three models was positive. 
Having a city manager form of government was associated with a 473.2 percent increase 
in the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in economic development and a 461.1 percent 
increase in the likelihood of vertical collaboration in economic development. Having a 
mayor-council form of government was associated with a 193.3 percent increase in the 
likelihood of horizontal collaboration in public safety. Giving the fact that the city 
manager form of government is seen to be more development oriented than its council-
mayor counterpart, it is not surprising to find in this study that having a manager form of 
government is associated with bilateral and vertical collaboration in economic 
development. These findings are consistent with the observations of Leroux (2006), 
Shrestha (2005) and Adhikari (2015) that form of government has an influence on the 
likelihood of interlocal cooperation. 
 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of variables that were significant in the study whilst table 










Summary of Significant Variables 
Variables Public Safety Economic 
development 
Infrastructure 
V. H. M. B. V. H. M. B. V. H. M. B. 
Collaboration in 
other services 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes - - yes - 
Repeated 
interaction 
yes yes yes yes yes - yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fiscal Capacity  - - - - - - - - *yes - - - 
County Density *yes - - - - - yes - - yes - *yes
City population  - - - - - yes - - - - - *yes
Median income  *yes yes *yes - - - - - - *yes - - 
County seat - *yes - - yes - *yes yes - - - - 
Mayor Council  - yes - - - - - - - - - - 
City Manager - - - - yes - - yes - - - - 
 





*variable is significant but inconsistent with expected direction 
 Spaces marked (-) indicates variable is not significant in the model. 















Results of Test of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses  Results 
Hypothesis 1:  
Cities are more likely to collaborate vertically on services 






Hypothesis 2:  
Cities are more likely to collaborate horizontally on 
services that have lower levels of asset specificity and 
measurement difficulty. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  
Cities are more likely to collaborate multilaterally on 
services that have higher levels of asset specificity and 
measurement difficulty. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  
Cities are more likely to collaborate bilaterally on services 
that have lower levels of asset specificity and 
measurement difficulty 
 
Hypothesis 5:  
Repeated interaction in the past between transacting 
jurisdictions increases the likelihood of collaboration. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  
Collaboration in other service areas has a positive effect 
on the likelihood of collaborating on the service in 
question. 
Not supported 
Services that have high 
levels of asset specificity 
and measurement 
difficulty have a greater 
association with 


































Collaborative governance has gained traction in recent years. From environmental 
resource management to public safety, collaborative governance continues to play a vital 
role in regional problem solving. Proponents have attributed the increasing popularity of 
the concept to the changing dynamics and complexity of 21st century problems which 
require collaborative efforts beyond the fragmented state.  
Indeed, for a long time America’s fragmented political system has been an 
enduring subject of debate attracting both support and criticisms. Proponents, particularly 
those from the public choice school, have often viewed fragmentation as an opportunity 
competition and efficiency in public service delivery.  On the other hand, some critics 
have repudiated the system for its duplicative and wasteful tendencies (Frederickson, 
1999). Other critics have cited problems of inner city decline, widening of the income 
gap between central cities and suburbs and environmental degradation as some of the 
problems of America’s fragmented local government system. As a solution to these 
negative impacts some scholars have proposed political consolidation. Yet evidence 
suggests consolidation by itself also creates principal-agent problems which lead to 
further inefficiencies in the supply of public services.  
To avoid loss of jurisdictional autonomy from political consolidation and the 
occasional lack of private market for certain public services from public choice, many 
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local governments have embraced the idea of pulling resources together with other local 
governments to deliver public services. The surge of interest in collaborative governance 
concept calls for critical enquiry into why local governments chose certain types of 
interlocal agreements. Questions worthy of enquiry include: (1) what motivates interlocal 
collaboration? (2) How do interlocal agreements differ by service type? (3) What are the 
directions of collaboration? (4) What number of partners is appropriate for collaboration? 
 
Determinants of Vertical, Horizontal, Multilateral and Bilateral Collaboration  
This study sought to find answers to the questions listed above by examining the 
patterns of interlocal collaboration in the Commonwealth of Kentucky using transaction 
cost theory and the concept of exchange embeddedness as theoretical lenses. Based on 
existing interlocal agreement data from the Kentucky Department of Local Governments 
this study has shown that for services like public safety, economic development and 
infrastructure, majority of municipalities prefer to participate in agreements that have at 
least one county government as partner. Similarly, majority of municipalities prefer to be 
in agreements that have only two participating local governments.  
The study has also buttressed previous findings that the transaction characteristics 
of services (asset specificity and service measurability) have strong influence on the 
likelihood of collaboration. In terms of direction, the study has confirmed that services 
that have high levels of asset specificity but easily measurable have a greater association 
with vertical collaboration whilst services that have high levels of asset specificity and 
measurement difficulty have a greater association with horizontal collaboration. It has 
also established that that services that have high levels of asset specificity but easily 
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measurable have a greater association with bilateral collaboration whilst services that 
have high levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty have a greater association 
with multilateral collaboration.  
The study has further established that a municipality’s collaborations in other 
services and repeated interaction in the past have the most influence on the likelihood of 
vertical collaboration in public safety and the least influence on the likelihood of 
horizontal collaboration in economic development. In terms of number of partners, the 
study has shown that collaborations in other services and repeated interaction have the 
most influence on the likelihood of multilateral collaboration for public safety and the 
least influence on the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in infrastructure. The study has 
thus demonstrated that repeated interactions in the past and collaborations in other related 
services have significant influence on interlocal collaborations.  
 
Implications of Study: Main Contributions to Scholarship 
The study has made important contributions that enhance existing knowledge on 
collaborative governance in the fields of public management, and urban studies. It has 
validated and in certain cases refuted hypotheses by its predecessors. At the conceptual 
level, the study complements the existing theory of collaborative governance and helps 
initiate further scholarly discussion on the topic. Spatially, the research contributes to the 
existing practice of regionalism by providing in-depth explanation to the structure and 
nature of exchange in collaborative governance. 
Previous research has focused on the general determinants of collaboration 
without identifying what services are the strongest candidates for collaboration. To a 
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certain extent, this study has addressed this gap by examining three important local 
government services – public safety, economic development and infrastructure. From the 
analyses, public safety ranked highest as the service that attracts most collaborative 
agreements. 
Previous research has also failed to examine the different levels of government 
that mostly appear as candidates for partnerships. This study has addressed this gap by 
identifying and examining two directions of collaboration – vertical and horizontal. The 
analyses of data revealed that vertical collaboration remains the preferred mode of 
collaboration for municipalities. 
Again, previous research has failed to examine the number of partners in 
collaborative arrangements. This study has addressed this gap by identifying and 
examining two types of partners – multilateral and bilateral. The analyses of data 
revealed that bilateral collaboration remains the preferred mode of collaboration for 
municipalities. 
Finally the study has also corroborated findings from previous research that the 
transaction cost and relational dimensions of exchange are important determinants of 
local governments’ choice of interlocal exchange.  
 
Limitations of This Study 
Notwithstanding its theoretical, methodological and empirical strengths, this study 
is limited in a number of ways. First, the robustness of the results in this study could have 
been improved by examining both the likelihood and magnitude of collaboration in 
Kentucky. Statistical analyses on the magnitude of collaboration were not performed in 
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this study because of the general lack of data on intergovernmental revenues and 
expenditures. Where data was available from the US Census Bureau and State databases, 
revenue and expenditure streams between counties and cities were usually not reported. 
The Kentucky ‘City Uniform Financial Information Report’, which is the source of 
intergovernmental revenue and expenditure data did not provide any information on city 
to county revenue transfers. Thus even in cases where data on city to city revenue 
transfers existed, this research was still limited in the area of county to city transfers. 
Additionally, most of the intergovernmental transfers registered with the Department of 
Local Governments were joint service agreements rather than pay-for-service 
agreements, meaning there was more human resource and equipment transfers than fund 
transfers.  
Second, this study was undertaken based on secondary data from only one state 
(Kentucky) in the entire US. Because the US is politically, economically and socially 
diverse, the results from this study cannot be taken in its entirety as a true reflection of 
the patterns of collaboration in the country. Research shows for instance that local 
government decisions are to a large extent influenced by state rules and regulations 
Krueger and Bernick 2010, 714). Since every state rule affects localities differently it 
stands to reason that the causal chains of collaboration at the local level in Kentucky may 
be different from that of Indiana for instance.  
Third, the study uses data on municipalities that range from very small (230 
people) to small (61,488 people). This selection eliminates mid-sized and large cities 
which are known to offer more variety of services to residents. To the extent that this 
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study relies on a small sample data from only one state in the US, any generalizations 
from this study will have to be made with a certain degree of caution. 
Finally, the study showed high percentage figures for vertical collaborations. This 
may be critiqued on purely methodological grounds. In my analyses every agreement that 
had at least one county partner was deemed vertical even if it had only one county but 
several cities. The study was designed based on the premise that the role of counties as 
administrative arms of the state gives them the upper hand in an agreement (Dustin et al., 
2009). The counter argument is that in some agreements large municipalities may rather 
have the upper hand because of their superior management systems (Caruson & 
MacManus, 2006b, 2008).  
 
Future Direction of Research 
While this study has been largely successful in explaining the patterns of 
interlocal collaboration, there still remains certain theoretical aspects of the concept that 
need further investigations and clarifications. This research can serve as a good starting 
point for such future investigations.  
First, in terms geographic of scope, the study was restricted to one out of 50 states 
in the US. Moreover, the units of analyses did not include mid-sized and large cities 
which are known to offer more variety of services to residents. Future studies should 
correct this anomaly by expanding the study to include mid-size and large MSAs from 
other states. Enlarging the scope of the study to include cites and MSAs in all four 
geographic regions of the US will improve the generalizability of results.  
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Second, the direction and number of partners in a collaborative arrangement 
should not be solely determined by a binary choice (yes or no). it is an established fact 
that collaborative arrangements between local governments also differ in terms of the 
degree of collaboration. In public safety for instance the degree of collaboration on law 
enforcement services between jurisdiction X and Y may be entirely different from a 
similar agreement between jurisdiction A and B. The use of revenue and expenditure data 
to analyze the degree of interlocal agreement in any future research will bolster the 
findings of this study.  
Third, the influence of transaction characteristics (asset specificity and 
measurement difficulty) on the pattern of collaboration was examined in this study using 
descriptive statistics. This method can be improved by using scalar measures of asset 
specificity and measurement difficulty for all services in future studies. A database of 
asset specificity and service measurability measures derived from a survey of local 
government officials across the US will improve future results. 
Fourth, future research should consider exploring the spatial dynamics of vertical, 
horizontal, multilateral and bilateral collaboration. Although this study enhanced our 
understanding of the patterns of collaboration, it failed to show how such patterns self 
organize in space. The use of GIS to generate such interactions will improve our 
understanding of how collaborative governance manifests across regions. 
Finally, future studies should explore the extent to which vertical, horizontal, 
bilateral and multilateral patterns of interlocal service delivery produce cost savings, 
improve service quality and enhance citizen satisfaction. Having a good understanding of 
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the benefits of these four patterns of collaboration will be helpful for local government 
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APPENDIX 1:                                                                                     
Municipal Service Classification by Asset Specificity and Service Measurability 
  Low Asset Specificity High Asset Specificity 
Easy 
Metering 
Meterable Market Services  
Residential Solid Waste 
Commercial Solid Waste 
Solid Waste Disposal 
Street Repair 




Cemetery Maintenance and 
Operation 
Parking Lot Operation 
Utility Meter Reading 
Utility Meter Billing 
Hazardous Materials Disposal 
Vehicle Towing 









Meterable Monopoly Services  
Operation of Bus System 
Operation of Paratransit System 
Operation of Airports 
Water Distribution 
Water Treatment 
Sewage Collection and Treatment 




Operation of Libraries 
Operation of Museums 
Heavy Equipment Maintenance 
Emergency Vehicle Maintenance 
Tax Collection 
Title/Plat Maintenance 
Parking Meter Maintenance 
Police and Fire Communications 
Difficult 
Metering 
Non-Meterable Market Services  
Child Welfare 





Insect and Rodent Control 
Animal Control 
Animal Shelters 
Public Health Programs 












Inspection and Code Enforcement 
Prisons and Jails 
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